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This thesis contains three separate papers. A balance of questions: what can we ask of
climate change economics? is a critical analysis of the economics of climate change literature.
It concludes that much more research effort needs to be put into studying the investment
needed for a transition to a zero carbon energy infrastructure, rather than the focus on
determining the social cost of carbon. The interaction of scale economies and energy quality
is a theoretical study of the ability of economies to operate given different qualities of energy
resources. Measuring costs and benefits of independence is an analysis of the welfare costs to
Catalonia from reduced trade, which may arise on independence from Spain. These costs are
set against the benefits to Catalonia of not paying fiscal transfers to the rest of Spain.
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A balance of questions: what can we ask of climate change
economics?
Abstract
The standard approach to the economics of climate change, which has its best known
implementation in Nordhaus’s DICE and RICE models (well described in the Nordhaus (2008)
book, A Question of Balance) is not well equipped to deal with the possibility of catastrophe,
since we are unable to evaluate a risk averse representative agent’s expected utility when
there is any significant probability of zero consumption. Whilst other authors attempt to
develop new tools with which to address these problems, the simple solution proposed in
this paper is to ask a question that the currently available tools of climate change economics
are capable of answering. Rather than having agents optimally choosing a path (that differs
from the recommendations of climate scientists) within models which cannot capture the
essential features of the problem, I argue that economic models should be used to determine
the savings and investment paths which implement climate targets that have been suggested
in the physical science literature.
4
1 Introduction
This article argues that there are two different questions that an economic analysis of climate
change could address when providing advice to policymakers using dynamic general equilibrium
models. These questions are: ‘What is the social cost of carbon given a climate change externality? ’
and ‘Given a cumulative emissions target, what carbon tax implements this target? ’ Both these
questions are important, but in giving policy advice, we can provide a much less uncertain answer
to the second question than we can to the first. The positive methodology employed in answering
these two questions is the same but the normative question is different. The standard approach
to climate change economics, as pioneered by Nordhaus (see Nordhaus (2008) for a comprehensive
summary), attempts to answer the first of these questions by evaluating the price of carbon (equal
to the social cost of carbon) that a social planner would have to set, in order to implement the
policy programme that maximises their lifetime CRRA utility objective function, in a world where
high temperatures damage production or utility, and production in the absence of abatement
technology causes high temperatures. Answering the second question involves treating a given
climate change target as a resource constraint, and evaluating the tax that incentivises investment
in a zero carbon economy such that this investment is complete before the resource constraint is
bust.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, I discuss the literature and describe the climate
change policy advice that comes from both the climate-economy and climate science literatures, and
highlight differences between them. In section 3, I classify economic modelling efforts according to
the assumptions about catastrophe that implicitly lie behind them, and place the physical science
policy advice within this framework. This classification exercise highlights the fundamental reasons
for the differences in policy recommendations that are discussed in section 2, and motivates a focus
on the second question: ‘What is the carbon tax required to implement a scientifically determined
target? ’. Section 4 discusses the fact that, given current knowledge, and the currently accepted
welfare framework, the only rigorous answer to the first question, ‘What is the social cost of
carbon? ’, is undefined, which further motivates a focus on the second question. This section also
describes some of the work that is being done on developing alternative welfare frameworks, which
will eventually (but not yet) allow us to answer this first question. In section 5, I sketch a solution
to the second question, and highlight the result that asking a different question can produce
qualitatively different policy advice: I present a strong result on the implication of targeting a
cumulative emissions limit on the level and timepath of carbon taxes that is not revealed by
standard climate economy models. Section 6 concludes.
This paper therefore both makes clear the questions that are important in climate change
economics, and provides an outline answer to the easier of the two. Despite being an easier question,
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it is a less researched and possibly more policy relevant question. Given a super-abundance of fossil
fuels, and a backstop technology that is only available with large scale investment, what carbon
price path should the policymaker implement to meet a cumulative emissions target? Questions
like this have been addressed before (e.g. Nordhaus (2008) talks of the application of the DICE
2007 model to binding temperature and CO2 concentration limits) and it is the discussion of the
prominence that such questions are given, and the implications of answering different questions,
that is the contribution of this paper. The question that this paper claims is should be focused upon
in climate change economics is consistent with the argument made by Sinn (2009) in which he says
“the core question ... [is] how to induce the resource owners to leave more carbon underground, as
that is the sole possible way to solve the climate problem.” However, I argue that the framework
in which Sinn (2009) operates cannot address the problem he sets himself.
2 Climate change policy advice
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, Solomon, Dahe, Manning, and et al.
(2007)), stated and evidenced that there were “reasons for concern” that climate change greater
than 2 − 3oC may be dangerous. This “danger” is due to the possibility that there may be
thresholds in the climate system that mean large changes, outwith the range of model predictions,
are possible. Many climate scientists are coming to the belief that avoiding thresholds, or tipping
points, in the climate system, is the crucial aspect of climate policy (see e.g. Alley, Marotzke,
Nordhaus, Overpeck, Peteet, Jr., Pierrehumbert, Rhines, Stocker, Talley, and Wallace (2003),
Overpeck and Cole (2006), & Lenton, Held, Kriegler, Hall, Lucht, Rahmstorf, and Schellnhuber
(2008)). In 2005 the European Union adopted a 2oC temperature rise limit (above pre-industrial
global temperatures) as a policy goal. Given central estimates of climate sensitivity to increases in
CO2 concentrations of ∼ 3
oC for a doubling of atmospheric CO2, this implies a CO2 concentrations
limit of ∼ 450ppm (given that pre-industrial concentrations were ∼ 280ppm). However, as evidence
accumulates, some have argued that the 450ppm target is too lenient, e.g. Hansen, Sato, Kharecha,
Beerling, Berner, Masson-Delmotte, Pagani, Raymo, Royer, and Zachos (2008) recommend a target
of, and describe a scenario whereby, atmospheric CO2 levels are down to no more that 350ppm by
2100.
A particularly easy to express and communicate target is introduced by Allen, Frame, Hunt-
ingford, Jones, Lowe, Meinshausen, and Meinshausen (2009) who note that climate models seem
relatively insensitive to the timepath of emissions, and rather cumulative emission targets are
much more useful. In keeping with the 2oC limit, they suggest a cumulative emissions target of 1
trillion tonnnes of carbon (1TtC). Given that historical emissions since the start of the industrial
revolution are estimated at around 500 billion tonnes of carbon (500GtC), this means we are half
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way through our allowance, and have 500GtC left to burn. This is much less than the available
fossil fuel resource (see Brandt and Farrell (2007)).
This policy advice from the climate science community can be contrasted with that coming
from the climate-economy literature. To summarise this, I focus on Tol (2009) which suveys prior
literature. In surveying the economics of climate change field, Tol notes that an “area of agreement
between these studies is that the welfare effect of a doubling of the atmospheric concentration of
greenhouse gas emissions on the current economy is relatively small - a few percentage points
of GDP. ... roughly equivalent to a year’s growth in the global economy - which suggests that
over a century or so, the economic loss from climate change is not all that large.” This summary
is borne out by the fact that the climate-economy studies do not deem it optimal to stick to
a 2oC temperature rise limit. This disagreement with the recommendations coming from the
climate science community may seem strange given that many of these models include a simplified
environmental model that has been calibrated to reproduce the temperature rises seen in climate
models. For example, the DICE 2007 model described in Nordhaus (2008) has been calibrated
to the MAGICC climate model1. And the evidence for economic damages from a given level
of warming, whilst highly uncertain, has been researched (see Nordhaus (2008)) and cannot be
dimissed.
The disagreement in policy recommendations, ultimately arises from the possibility of catastro-
phe - from the possibility that the actual climate response to a large increase in CO2 concentrations
will be much greater than implied in the climate science models. Beyond 2−3oC ‘here be dragons’
and explore these regions at your peril. The climate-economy models surveyed by Tol (2009) agree
with the central projections from the climate science models by construction, and it is likely that
climate damages associated with these projections are low in the context of overall global output
- but this is because no tipping points are breached, and catastrophic dynamics are not set in
motion. The calibration of the climate side of climate-economy models to the central projection
from models used in climate science, whilst clearly constraining the policy recommendations from
the climate-economy literature, is not capturing the state of scientific knowledge of climate change.
Experience to date has tended to track the worst case simulations from climate science models,
suggesting that these models have been constructed on a conservative basis (Bryssea, Oreskesb,
O’Reilly, and Oppenheimer (2013)). Further, climate science models have difficulty in matching
some features of the known paleoclimate record, and of matching the tipping-point, threshold
behaviour, suggested by paleoclimatic data (see Valdes (2011)). The central IPCC climate pro-
jections contain no threshold effects at a 2oC temperature rise and the accompanying warning of
“reasons for concern” that climate change greater than 2 − 3oC may be dangerous, is due to the
1Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change. See
http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/wigley/magicc/
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sense that climate science practitioners have that the models’ central projections cannot be trusted
for large climate forcings - largely because of this failure to match the paleoclimate record.
In addition to the treatment of catastrophe causing a problem in deriving an optimal policy
in climate-economy studies (discussed further in the next section), there is a further problem with
surveying the social cost of carbon (or equivalently the optimal carbon tax) across the economics
of climate change literature and producing mean or median estimates that may be regarded as the
considered view of the economics profession. Many articles make a methodological contribution or
add some new feature to the climate-economy models. Their social cost estimate should therefore
not be viewed as a data point towards what the economics profession think the optimal carbon
price is, but rather as determining the marginal value of this new feature on the optimal carbon tax.
For example, Lemoine and Traeger (2012), and Brock, Engstrom, and Xepapadeas (2012) describe
climate economy models with a non-catastrophic “tipping point” and so their contribution can be
viewed as estimating the marginal value of this feature. Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski
(2011) derive, under certain assumptions, a closed form optimal tax formulation that depends
only on the parameters of the model rather than knowledge of the future evolution of the model’s
endogenous variables, and so contribute to the climate change economist’s toolbox rather than
providing a data point for a survey.
3 Classifying approaches to climate change economics
I classify climate-economy studies into 4 groups depending on whether there is or is not a tipping
point, whether avoiding crossing this tipping point on a CO2 stabilisation path is technologically
feasible, and whether crossing the tipping point is catastrophic or not. Before describing this
classification, I shall first outline exactly what I mean by a tipping point and discuss some evidence
that means that we cannot rule out tipping points being catastrophic for global civilisation.
A tipping point is a feature of dynamical systems with multiple steady states. As some forcing
(like CO2 from human emissions, or insolation (a measure of solar energy received on the Earth’s
surface)) is applied to a system (like the Earth’s climate), the equilibrium state of the system may
change smoothly, or it may change discontinuously across a tipping point. Reversing the forcing
change need not reverse the movement across the tipping point. For example Zaliapin and Ghi
(2010) present a simple energy balance model of an water-world Earth-like system that is vulnerable
to a catastrophic cooling to a snowball Earth state. The mechanism for this is that ice is much
more reflective than water and so a world with intermediate levels of incoming solar radiation
can be either cold or hot. If cold then the planet is ice-covered and heat reflecting (high albedo)
which induces energy balance at a cold temperature, if warm then the planet is water-covered and
heat absorbing (low albedo) which induces energy balance at a warm temperature i.e. two steady
8
states. Suppose the system is in the cold, ice-covered steady state, then in order to transition to
the warm steady state, incoming solar radiation has to be raised to a very high level to the point
where ice cannot exist, at which point the cold steady state cannot exist and temperatures rise
catastrophically as we cross the tipping point. The situation is well described by the bifurcation
diagram, figure 3.1, taken from Zaliapin and Ghi (2010) which shows the equilibrium insolation
and temperature combinations in their model.



















current Earth state 
Figure 3.1: Energy Balance model of Snowball Earth from Zaliapin and Ghi (2010)
There are multiple sources of possible tipping points in the real Earth system including:
• The loss of polar ice at higher temperatures leading to a loss of albedo and a further rise in
temperatures;
• Higher temperatures reducing ocean turnover, which reduces ocean productivity and carbon
absorbtion and storage, causing a further rise in temperatures;
• Higher temperatures drying out peat bogs at high latitudes, melting methane hydrates in
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ocean sediments, and burning tropical forests, all causing carbon emissions from the natural
environment, and hence a further rise in temperatures.
Each of these could lead to tipping points as the Earth transitions from one steady state to another.
And once we hit a tipping point, change can be very fast: we have evidence (Alley (1993)) that
there were changes (at least at the regional, if not the global, level) of as much as 10oC in as little
as a decade, as Earth was coming out of the last ice age. Given our industrial society and economy,
such rapid change could be very destabilising and damaging.
Figure 3.2: Approximate paleoclimate history, taken from http://www.scotese.com/climate.htm,
created by Prof C Scotese, University of Texas at Arlington, Dept. Earth & Environmental Sciences
The geological record of global temperatures is suggestive of multiple steady states (see Figure
3.2). Futher, there is evidence that the majority of the mass extinctions in the fossil record are
10
associated with greenhouse warming events (see Ward (2006) for a summary). It therefore seems
clear that it is certainly possible that mechanisms exist such that sudden drastic warming is caused
as a tipping point is passed, and that the impact of this warming is catastrophic - possibly enough
to cause civilisational collapse or even human extinction. This may not be the central expectation,
but many physical scientists are warning that catastrophe is possible: see Hansen (2009) for a
comprehensive account of the fears of one prominent climate scientist who clearly believes that
human caused greenhouse gas emssions could lead to an extinction level catastrophe.
The 4 groups in the climate-economy study classification are described below. The charts
accompanying these classifications have been created with the simple climate-economy model with
tipping point outlined in the Appendix.
1. No tipping point: damages, however severe, are a smooth function of stabilisation CO2
concentrations, and are never catastrophic. This is the case considered by Nordhaus (2008),
Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011), and in the underlying papers of the Tol
(2009) survey.
2. A non-catastrophic tipping point. The optimum may be before, at, or after the tipping
point, and stabilisation before may or may not be feasible. This is the case that Brock,
Engstrom, and Xepapadeas (2012) and Lemoine and Traeger (2012) model. Figures 3.3 and
3.4 illustrates the cases with feasible stabilisation before the tipping point, and with optima
at and after the tipping point.
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Figure 3.3: Utility (= Utility Benefit - Utility Cost) & Marginal Utility (with Marginal Benefit
& Marginal Cost shown seperately) with a non-catastrophic tipping point - stabilisation at the
tipping point is optimal
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Figure 3.4: Utility & Marginal Utility with a non-catastrophic tipping point - stabilisation after
the tipping point is optimal
3. There is a case where we cannot afford to stabilise before the tipping point (since the costs
of doing this are greater than output in the policy period), but crossing the tipping point is
catastrophic and corresponds to some civilisational collapse or extinction event as discussed
above. This maximisation problem has no solution. Considering this to be one possible
outcome in an ex-ante unknown problem, then any significant probability attached to this
event will cause the optimisation under uncertainty to have no solution. This essentially is
the case described by the Dismal Theorem in Weitzman (2009) (discussed further in Section
4): whatever the level of unaffordable stabilisation costs, there is some small but non-zero
probability (fat-tailed density) that a catastrophe occurs before this stabilisation level.
4. A catastrophic tipping point, but stabilisation before this tipping point is possible. There is
infinite marginal benefit of climate policy implementation at the tipping point. Figures 3.5
and 3.6 illustrates this. This is the scenario that the climate science community is warning
about: we cannot rule out tipping points being catastrophic, but it is likely that we can do
something about the problem if we act quickly and decisively to implement climate policy.
Stabilisation at or before the tipping point is optimal. Given uncertainty about exactly where
the tipping point is, stabilisation exactly at the tipping point will be impossible. Assuming
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scientific advice to be erring on the cautionary side, following scientific advice is stabilisation
before the tipping point. This is a realistic policy scenario.
Figure 3.5: Utility & Marginal Utility with a catastrophic tipping point - stabilisation at the
tipping point is optimal
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Figure 3.6: Utility & Marginal Utility with a catastrophic tipping point - stabilisation before the
tipping point is optimal
Given this classification, we can see clearly where the divergence in policy advice between
those arguing within the paradigm of case 4 (climate science recommendations), and those arguing
within the paradigm of case 1 (the majority of climate change economics), comes from. However,
this classification also reveals that the work of Brock, Engstrom, and Xepapadeas (2012) and
Lemoine and Traeger (2012), (case 2), does not help in bridging this divide: it may be optimal to
stabilise at a point after a non-catastrophic tipping point, and Brock, Engstrom, and Xepapadeas
(2012) and Lemoine and Traeger (2012) merely discuss particulars of such models. The existence
of non-catastrophic tipping points does affect optimising behaviour in ways related to the system
dynamics and the degree of risk aversion of the agents, however these models do not help us at all
in determining where the tipping points are, our how damaging they will be. Given that we cannot
rule out catastrophic damages (and indeed suspect that they may exist), then unless we change
the welfare framework (discussed in Section 4), we are, at least in a probabilistic sense, in case 3
(cue tearing of hair and gnashing of teeth, we’re all doomed!) or case 4 (sensible but urgent policy
advice). Stabilisation before any tipping point is likely (though not certainly) feasible and optimal.
Climate models, being detailed models of the climate, are more appropriate than any climate-
economy models (which necessarily have more approximation in order to facilitate optimisation) for
determining where the tipping points are. These climate models have not answered this question
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yet, so the best we, as economists, can do is to trust what practitioners in this field say and
recommend. For the economics of climate change, as Pindyck (2012) says “it seems to me that a
very detailed and complex modeling exercise is unlikely to be helpful”, we should let the climate
science community do the heavy modelling work, take their recommendations, and concentrate on
modelling the economic impacts and determining the economic instruments that implement policy.
4 Dealing with the First Question
Nordhaus’s standard approach to climate change economics, which (as discussed) is an effort to
answer the ‘What is the social cost of carbon? ’ question, was extensively criticised by Weitzman
in a series of papers (see principally Weitzman (2009)) in which he shows that, allowing for un-
certainty, this carbon price is infinite. Weitzman’s Dismal Theorem applies to problems which use
an objective function with infinite marginal utility of consumption at the zero consumption level,
combined with an effective probability mass2 attached to catastrophe, which equates to this zero
consumption level.
It is easy to to object to this conclusion, which implies that society would optimally allocate
an arbitrarily high share of current output to preventing tiny but non-zero risks of catastrophe or
extinction. And while we may believe that society should devote more resources to climate change
mitigation (or to developing asteroid or super-volcano protection systems etc) than it currently
does, we are unlikely to believe that the resources so allocated should be approximately 100% of
current output. However, on what grounds do we object to Weitzman’s theorem? Which of the
underlying assumptions do we disagree with?
According to Millner (2011), there are three bottom-up grounds to object to Weitzman’s meth-
ods and, therefore, conclusions: is it reasonable to attach a probability mass point to the possibility
of catastrophe; is the assumption of infinite marginal utility of consumption at a zero consumption
level reasonable; and, is this analysis under uncertainty relevant to a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA)
of climate policy? Millner concludes that only the infinite marginal utility of consumption critique
has validity. Therefore, in order to evaluate the social cost of carbon we need to study how to
(finitely) value catastrophe risks i.e. risks to civilisation or risks of human extinction.
Weitzman (2009) discusses doing this by truncating the valuation attached to bad events, using
a Value of Statistical Life (VSL) method. However this approach is shown to generate results in
which the truncation becomes the dominant factor in the CBA calculation (so the size of the median
impact does not really effect the calculation, the impact comes almost entirely from the choice of
2Weitzman’s result is stronger than this in that it actually just relies on fat tails, either in the distribution of
environmental outcomes or in the distribution of economic damages associated with a particular level of environ-
mental outcome. Describing this result as applying due to a probability mass on catastrophic outcomes is intuitive
though.
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truncation methodology). Ikefuji, Laeven, Magnus, and Muris (2011) describe a stochastic climate
economy model with non CRRA utility specifications chosen to produce robust policy prescriptions.
This is an attempt to deduce a welfare framework on decision making under uncertainty about
catastrophe from the axiom that ex-ante policy is both optimal and reasonable (i.e. not 100%
of output). Millner (2011) is also a discussion the development of a welfare framework in which
it is sensible to ask how we should value civilisation preserving policies, and which does not run
into the Dismal Theorem’s paradoxical infinities. This question is an interesting and important
research question, but it is also a hard problem (and perhaps more philosophical than economic),
and in the meantime, what advice do we give to policymakers on optimal climate change policy?
The answer proposed in this paper is to change the question: if we assume that following the
advice of the climate science community eliminates the risk of catastrophe, then we could use a
CRRA utility specification that exhibits infinite marginal utility at zero consumption, since we
would only be using this welfare framework in its natural setting i.e. for consumption-savings
decisions well away from the zero consumption level. We cannot strictly make this assumption,
therefore we are not asking ‘what is the optimal policy?’, rather we are imposing scientific advice
as a resource constraint and asking what price implements this constraint. The normative question
is different - but still policy relevant and can be reconciled with the views of the climate science
community.
5 Sketching a solution to the Second Question
In this section, I set out to answer the second question that practitioners within the economics
of climate change should be addressing: ‘Given a cumulative emissions target, what carbon tax
implements this target? ’. I base the model I use to answer this question, to a limited extent, on
Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011), not because I intend to argue with this paper
in particular, but because it is a recent paper with a clear calibration that I can use. However,
the main purpose of showing this exercise is to highlight the features that need to be included
within such a model (and which are often not included in climate-economy models that attempt
to answer the first question) and including these features has a strong impact upon the resulting
policy advice. The model in Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) does not have all these
required features and the policy recommendation from this paper repeat the claims of Sinn (2009)
that ad-valorem taxes on fossil fuels should fall over time in order to prevent resource owners
bringing forward their resource extraction activities (the so-called Green Paradox ). I present
different implications for the level and timepath of taxes - this highlights the fact that asking
different questions can produce different answers!
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Sinn (2009) states that “there are only two ways to curb the accumulation of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere and, with it, slow down global warming. We either temporarily refrain from
extracting carbon from the ground, or we stuff it back into the ground after having extracted its
energy. All the technical endeavours to develop alternative technologies and all economic incen-
tive systems to curb the greenhouse effect must subordinate themselves to this fundamental fact”
and “carbon extraction rates must be slowed down. The resource owners must be prompted to
temporarily leave more carbon underground.” Clearly, Sinn (2009) does not consider a cumulative
emissions limit3, but rather considers only managing the timepath of carbon emissions. The frame-
work that he considers then is already inconsistent with the findings of Allen, Frame, Huntingford,
Jones, Lowe, Meinshausen, and Meinshausen (2009). He further argues that it is only a political
economy issue that determines why policymakers might choose to have a low level of climate policy
now which is progressively made more stringent.
The theoretical solution to the Green Paradox presented by Sinn (2009) is to have stringent
climate policy which becomes more lax over time: a falling ad-valorem tax. This would incentivise
resource owners to postpone extraction. Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) also
report that carbon taxes should fall over time and that constant ad-valorem taxes have no effect
on usage. However, this conclusion is due to Inada conditions on the use of energy together with
no available alternative energy technologies (which are understandable modelling simplification
devices if the study is to addess the question of ‘What is the optimal carbon tax given a climate
change externality? ’). Given the Allen, Frame, Huntingford, Jones, Lowe, Meinshausen, and
Meinshausen (2009) conclusion that cumulative emissions are what matters and that some fossil
fuels should be left in the ground, making these assumptions mean that the conclusions of these
papers are not capable of being consistent with the climate science advice. By asking a different
question, ‘Given a cumulative emissions target, what carbon tax implements this target? ’, the
model presented here reaches a different conclusion on the time path of carbon taxes: ad-valorem
taxes must always be set at 100% in order for the owners of zero marginal cost resources to be
indifferent between extraction and leaving resources in the ground. A 100% ad-valorem tax is a
per unit energy tax equal to the marginal product of energy. If we are to use a lot of energy now,
in order to create an alternative energy infrastructure, then the marginal product of energy should
be low now and rise to some constrained energy future steady state i.e. we see a rising per unit
tax on carbon. This shows that, if we ask different questions, we get different answers.
Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) is a standard, smooth damages, climate econ-
omy general equilibrium model that has a number of interesting features, but whose main contri-
bution is the derivation, under certain assumptions, of a closed form optimal tax formulation that
3He does state that “the argument for permanently sealing off part of the resources still in situ to the detriment of
generations far in the future finds neither economic nor ethical justification.” But he does not justify this assertion.
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depends only on the parameters of the model rather than knowledge of the future evolution of
the model’s endogenous variables. The optimum level of carbon emissions in their results is much
greater than the 500GtC future cumulative emissions limit that Allen, Frame, Huntingford, Jones,
Lowe, Meinshausen, and Meinshausen (2009) recommend. Their optimal policy is determined by
balancing the marginal costs of climate change against marginal benefits of energy use (non carbon
energy sources are not available in their model until after the model’s time horizon of more than a
century). Their model does not consider the development of, and investment in, the alternative en-
ergy technologies needed for the post fossil fuel world. The focus therefore of the Golosov, Hassler,
Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) model (in common with most such models) is on the environmental
side which, as previously argued, climate economy models are poorly equiped to deal with, and not
at all on the investment side which economic models have comparative advantage in addressing.
I develop a simple two energy sector economy model with an available stock of carbon energy
resources, and also the technological possibility of building non carbon energy infrastructure. The
model is calibrated so that the social planner, faced with a resource constraint of using only those
resources used in the Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) optimum, sets a carbon
tax equal to that derived in the initial period of Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011)
i.e. $56.9/tC. Using this calibration, I can then estimate the carbon tax needed to implement
a resource restriction consistent with Allen, Frame, Huntingford, Jones, Lowe, Meinshausen, and
Meinshausen (2009). Climate damages do not enter the model: if we were to include climate
damages that were very low before the tipping point but infinite after it, instead of implementing
this via a resource constraint, then the results would not be much altered. The details of the
model and the solution algorithm are outlined in Appendix 2, but broadly the social planner has
logarithmic preferences over consumption, energy is essential for production and energy itself can
be produced from some stock S0 of fossil fuel or from some green-tech energy capital stock. The
social planner’s problem is to maximum lifetime utility by choosing consumption, investment in
capital, and investment in green-tech energy capital, subject to the available fossil fuel energy
resources.
We can determine the social planner’s optimum solution to the saving and investment problem
given various different values for S0. There is some true value for S0 (i.e. the S0 that pertains
in a laissez-faire world) but we want the decentralised solution to mimic social planner’s solution
from the constrained S0 run. We suppose there are a unit mass of identical, infinitesimal, price
taking, profit maximising fossil fuel resource owners whose extraction costs are always zero but
whose stock is limited to S0. Their profit maximisation decision is the quantity of fossil fuel, Ft to
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supply in each period:
Vt(St) = ptFt + rt+1Vt+1(St+1)
s.t. St+1 = St − Ft






Given that we want to impose a cumulative emissions limit S∗ << S0, there must be some
ST = S0 − S
∗ for which the marginal value of the stock (after the imposition of policy) is zero.
But this implies that the marginal value in all periods prior to T is also zero, and hence that the
net price receive for any resources extracted, pt, ∀t, is also zero. The optimal carbon tax then is
equal to the marginal product of energy in the social planner’s solution from the constrained S0
run, and fossil fuel suppliers are indifferent about the level of fuel that they supply. In equilibrium
the fossil fuel supply in this world with super-abundance of fossil fuel resources is the same as that
achieved in the social planners solution with the constrained S0.
The carbon tax must be equal to the marginal product of energy so that the final goods sector’s
net payment to the fossil fuel industry is always zero. The value of fossil fuel resources to their
owners is therefore always zero too (though the marginal value to society of increasing the amount
of fossil fuels that we are willing to burn is most definitely not zero). We can therefore implement a
restriction on the total allowable burnable fossil resource even in the presence of a super-abundance.
At time T the energy sector is entirely decarbonised. We proceed as follows (again full details in
Appendix 2):
• Assume the calibration of Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) and calibrate
production function so that current global capital stock and energy usage produces current
global GDP.
• Use the Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) carbon budget (substantially greater
than 500GtC) under their optimum policy as a resource constraint, and use their initial
carbon tax of $56.9/tC as a further calibration target to fully calibrate the model.
• Use the Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) carbon budget under their no policy
as a resource constraint and label as “Laissez Faire” in Figures 5.1, 5.2 & 5.3.
• The policy we cost here, from Allen, Frame, Huntingford, Jones, Lowe, Meinshausen, and
Meinshausen (2009), is restricting S0 to 500GtC. This model run is labelled as “500GtC” in
Figures 5.1, 5.2 & 5.3.
• The required carbon tax in the 500GtC policy scenario is found to be $70.5/tC at the outset.
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Figure 5.1: Fossil fuel use, in 1GtC, vs time
Figure 5.2: Carbon taxes, in $/tC, vs time
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Figure 5.3: Investment in alternative energy capital, as % of GDP , vs time
As well as reporting a higher tax needed to implement an emissions target that we already
know to be tighter than the optimum reported in Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011)
(not a surprising result), it is also interesting to report the time path of taxes and resource usage.
As discussed, in order to induce resource owners to leave resources in the ground when marginal
extraction costs are zero, the value of extraction must always be zero. This means that ad-valorem
taxes are 100% and dollar taxes are equal to the marginal product of energy. At outset, the
planner would like to use the endowment of allowed fossil fuels to produce and so consume whilst
also investing in alternative energy infrastructure. In a world where we are relatively energy
constrained in the no-fossil fuels future compared with today, the ultimate carbon tax will be
fairly high (because the marginal product of energy will be high). Initially there is relative energy
abundance and the marginal product of energy (which is the price that the final goods sector
pays for its energy), is lower than it will be in long run steady state (which relies entirely on the
backstop technology). Therefore, the dollar value of carbon taxes will be rising. Contrary to Sinn
(2009), it is not for political economy reasons4 that taxes are lower initially and rising, rather it is
that marginal product of energy is low and rising, and this is because we are willing to use fossil
fuels (lowering the marginal product of energy) to produce and invest in the early stages. We want
to do this because at this time we have no alternatives, and these alternatives must be built with
today’s output.
The claim that “A constant value-added tax does not affect the intertemporal decisions of the
firm, and hence has no effect on allocations, no matter how high this tax is” (Golosov, Hassler,
4Sinn (2009) “The largest reduction efforts are to be made in the far future, while the current generations are
largely spared. Politicians cannot do otherwise, alas, as they do not want to inflict the pain of immediate reductions
upon their voters. The year 2050 is so far in the future that the boldest policy proposals can be made now without
scaring voters off. After all, the onus will fall later on other citizens and other politicians who will have to tighten
their belts.”
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Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011)) is true only in a model in which there is no alternative energy supply
(which does not pay the tax) and in which the purpose of policy is to manage the time profile
of emissions rather than the cumulative total of emissions. The value added tax here is constant
(100%) and this is a general result for all cumulative emissions targets with zero extraction costs.
The fact that the dollar value of the carbon price is rising in the result generated here is not a
general result and will depend on the comparison between the initial marginal product of energy
in the social planner’s solution, and the ultimate steady state marginal product of (carbon free)
energy. The level of long run zero carbon energy supply is a key determinant of this steady state
carbon tax level.
To fully answer the question of what is the optimal carbon price to implement a cumulative
emissions target, we should include a more complete model of the energy sector. Such a model
would include features such as fossil fuel extraction costs, inelastic demand for energy, and tech-
nological progress. A full study would build upon the work of e.g. Hassler, Krusell, and Olovsson
(2011) who provide evidence that energy saving technical progress does respond to the energy
price, and that the elasticity of substitution between energy and other factors of production is
substantially less than 1; and P. and van Zon A. (2012) which is an example of a transition model
which incorporates endogenous growth. I believe the study of the transformation and decarboni-
sation of the energy sector (and the interaction that this transition with the rest of the economy)
is the central question of climate change economics, rather than the trade off between climate
damages and the benefit flow from emitting carbon.
6 Conclusion
This article has argued that the reason for the dichotomy in policy advice between the climate
science and economics literatures is fundamentally due to the treatment of catastrophic outcomes.
To proceed, we can:
1. ignore the possibility of catastrophe, as much of the economics literature has done, and make
policy recommendations that are far too light;
2. allow for catastrophe within our current welfare framework and recommend that we devote
100% of output to climate change mitigation (and another 100% of output to prevent other
unlikely catastrophes!);
3. develop a new welfare framework in which we can sensibly evaluate policies that payoff
only in preventing civilsational collapse or human extinction, and in the meantime, try not
to muddy the waters with our half formed views of what appropriate policy is for climate
change mitigation;
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4. take the cumulative emissions limits, given to us by the climate science community, as re-
source constraints, and evaluate optimal policy conditional on staying within these con-
straints. The only way for the answer to this question to also be the answer to the“what
is the optimal policy” question, is for scientists to be able to guarantee that following their
advice would prevent catastrophe. Of course no such guarantees can be offered.
Whilst both options 3 and 4 above are sensible, this article is an appeal for more efforts to be
put into 4. The minimal features that a model which can address 4 must exhibit are an alternative
energy infrastructure technology and an ability for agents to leave resources in the ground. Such
models could be used to provide highly relevant input that could inform the debate as to optimal
climate change mitigation strategies.
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The very simple climate-economy model presented in this appendix is used to generate the utility
and marginal utility charts in Section 3. The tipping point is generated with a methane hydrate
reservoir of size M̄ with an emission process given by:
Ṁt = −max [0, Tt − T
∗
M ]Mt
Mt ∈ [0, M̄ ]
Where T ∗M is the destabilisation temperature for the methane hydrate stocks. There are two
possible stable states for this system:
• If human emissions cause a temperature rise of less than T ∗M then methane hydrate stocks
are not destabilised and ultimate CO2 levels are just given by pre-industrial levels and those
human emissions that remain in the atmosphere.
• If human emissions cause a temperature rise of more than T ∗M then methane hydrate stocks
are destabilised and ultimate CO2 levels are given by pre-industrial levels, remaining atmo-
spheric human emissions and M̄ .
Figure A.1 illustrates this model given a particular parameter set. It shows equilibrium CO2 levels
against pre-industrial plus remaining atmospheric human emissions, generated using a logarithmic
relationship between temperature change and CO2 increases with a climate sensitivity of 3
oC for
a doubling of CO2
5, T ∗M = 3
oC (above pre-industrial temperatures), and M̄ = 500ppm (which is
assumed either to all remain in the atmosphere or to be the remaining atmospheric amount from
the methane hydrate reservior).
5This fixes the climate sensitivity parameter, κ = (3oC)/ ln (2)
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Figure A.1: Simple Tipping Point Model with Methane Hydrates
Using this model (though not necessarily the above parameterisation), we can impose a modified
version of the climate damages function from Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011)6. The
Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) damage function is D(S) = 1− exp (−γ(S − S̄)),
with S̄ = 280ppm being pre-industrial atmospheric CO2 concentrations, and D expressed as the
percentage of output lost due to high temperatures. This specification is modified to allow for
the possibility that the tipping point is catastrophic i.e. in some circumstances we set D(S >
Stp) = 100%. Economic output is assumed to be constant and entirely consumed, except in the
first period when some some is spent on climate policy, such that costs are hyperbolic in the
stabilisation level. Utility is assumed to be CRRA, and climate policy is undertaken in the first
period to achieve some stabilisation level of atmospheric CO2 concentrations. This first period is
assumed to be long enough to fully implement emissions elimination at some stabilised level of
atmospheric CO2 concentrations, and for the climate system to reach equilibrium. Utility as a
function of the target CO2 stabilisation level (S, expressed in ppm CO2), and the other equations
6Which was calibrated to reproduce the damages from the DICE 2007 model described in Nordhaus (2008)
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of this simple model are:
U(S) =














, S > 394
D(S) =
{
DNC(Sult(S)) if the tipping point is not catastrophic,
DCat(Sult(S)) if the tipping point is catastrophic.










< T ∗M ,















< T ∗M ,





> T ∗M .
We can represent the utility maximisation problem as a comparison between the marginal
costs of implementing climate policy and the marginal benefits of implementing climate policy.
Targetting CO2 stabilisation at the tipping point Stp (defined by T (Stp) = T
∗
M) is always (at least
a one sided local) utility maximum and at this point there is a singularity in the marginal benefit
of implementing climate policy.
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B Appendix 2
Details and solution methods of the model used in Section 5. Variable definitions:
Yt ≡ Output
Ct ≡ Consumption
L ≡ Population (assumed constant)
Et ≡ Energy
Rt ≡ Renewable energy infrastructure
Ft ≡ Fossil fuels used
Kt ≡ Other physical capital
St ≡ Stocks of fossil fuels
It ≡ Investment in renewable energy infrastructure
0 < α < 1 ≡ Capital share of total income
0 < ν < 1 ≡ Energy share of total income
0 < γ < 1 ≡ Returns to scale in renewable energy production
0 < β < 1 ≡ Discount Factor
0 < δ < 1 ≡ Depreciation rate (of both R & K)
A′ ≡ Total factor productivity (assumed constant)
A = A′L1−α−ν
B ≡ Renewable energy infrastructure productivity (assumed constant)









Et = Ft +BR
γ
t
Rt+1 = Rt(1− δ) + It





ν − Ct − It
St+1 = St − Ft
Ft ≤ St , ∀t
Preferences - use log utility, so that the value function:
























































Ft < St ⇒ µt = 0
Ft = St ⇒ µt > 0
Eliminate marginal values to derive difference equations to characterise the system. 6 equations
in 6 unknowns, Kt, Rt, St, Ct, Ft, µt. We know K0, R0, S0. We shall need to construct an algorithm
to determine C0, F0 ≤ S0. Then (assuming F0 < S0) for times 1 ≤ t < T :
St = St−1 − Ft−1


































Time T is defined as the point, t, at which the first system above generates Ft > St. From t ≥ T
the system is specified by:
Ft = St
St = St−1 − Ft−1
































The time t value of each asset Kt, Rt, St is:
∂Vt
∂Kt























Therefore we calculate the total return on each asset over period (t, t + 1). By a no arbitrage




































Steady state can be calculated:
S∗ = 0
F ∗ = 0
K∗ =
(αABν(γν/α)γν













The algorithm to determine C0, F0 ≤ S0
• Given F0, adjust C0 so that Ct is arbitrarily close to C
∗ at some suitably large t (i.e use the
forward shooting method)
• If the total return on fossil fuels over the final period of their use is too high then they are
in too short supply and should be conserved at the outset i.e. F0 is too high and should be
lowered. Vice versa for total returns that are too low.
Calibration details:
• Assume the calibration of Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) i.e. α = 0.3,
ν = 0.03, β = 0.985 (per annum), δ = 1. Time step = 10 years. Therefore still have 3
unknown parameters: A,B, & γ.
• Assume initial alternative energy capital stock R0 = 0
• Estimate initial global capital stock, K0
7.
• Calibrate the TFP parameter, A = Y K−α0 E
−ν by taking 2011 GWP from the data and
estimating E by taking the percentage of global primary energy supply from fossil fuels
from data (∼ 80%) and combining with initial carbon usage from the laissez-faire version of
Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011), 128GtC, so that E = 128/80%.
• Following Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) let S0 = 1400 in laissez-faire
(400GtC from oil and 5000GtC from coal which has an efficiency of 0.2 and convert to
energy units (1GtC of oil gives 1 energy unit) rather than units of carbon). The Golosov,
71990 estimate of global capital stock taken from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993), rolled up to 2011 using Gross
World Product from Wikipedia
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Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011) optimum uses 691 energy units of fossil fuel and is
implemented using an initial carbon tax of $56.9/tC.
• Calibrate B & γ, using S0 = 691 (i.e. the Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski (2011)
optimum), by
1. assuming that E0 = 2E
∗ (i.e. we assume that a future world which uses non-fossil
energy resources will be more energy constrained than our current world - this may or
may not be a reasonable assumption, and it is important for the timepath of carbon
taxes.
2. matching the initial tax rate of $56.9/tC.
• The policy we cost here, from Allen, Frame, Huntingford, Jones, Lowe, Meinshausen, and
Meinshausen (2009), is restricting S0 to 420 energy units (400GtC of oil and 100GtC from
coal at 0.2 efficiency, to get the 1TtC cumulative emissions)8. This model run is labelled as
“500GtC” in Figures 5.1, 5.2 & 5.3.
• The required carbon tax in the 500GtC policy scenario is found to be $70.5/tC at the outset.
Figure B.1: Fossil fuel use, in energy units such that 1EU is provided by 1GtC of oil or 5GtC
of coal, vs time. The caption on Figure 5.1 in the main body of the text does not describe this
complication.
8The model actually produces fossil energy taxes applied to energy units and does not differentiate between oil
and coal. This is not too inappropriate for the 500GtC run since coal is not much used, it is less appropriate the
more coal that is in the mix.
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The interaction of scale economies and energy quality
Abstract
The defining feature of the natural resources literature is that resource scarcity is asso-
ciated with high resource prices that incentivise the exploitation of marginal resources and
the usage of alternatives. In this paper, this incentive is higher profitability in the extractive
sector, rather than simply a higher price for its output. Since energy is an essential input
to the economy, its supply affects the marginal products of other factors, and in general
equilibrium its supply affects the costs that the extractive industry faces. Energy sector prof-
itability is therefore ambiguously affected by the quality of available energy resources. There
are conditions related to the returns to scale in the economy which can cause lower energy
sector profitability with lower energy quality. This means that marginal resources may be
abandoned as high quality resources are lost. An economy which exhibits constant, or weakly
increasing, returns to scale can operate at any level of energy quality, since profitability rises
with falling energy quality and we observe results consistent with the usual Hotellings Rule.
However an economy which exhibits strongly increasing returns to scale cannot operate with
only low quality energy resources and profitability may fall with falling energy quality. It
is therefore possible that an energy quality shock disincentivises, rather than incentivises,
the use of marginal resources and alternatives. Ultimately, a strongly increasing returns to
scale economy may have no steady state equilibrium under a decentralised market allocation,
despite such an allocation being technologically feasible.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the economy’s response to being faced with only lower qual-
ity energy resources, with a view to characterising the situations under which this is problematic.
By “Problematic” in this context, I mean that we are unable to use all available resources; or that
as resources become scarcer, we receive a price signal that makes the use of resources less efficient,
and does not incentivise the use of alternatives. The scenario considered is that capital assets are
used to supply energy to the economy, but the manufacture of capital assets can be an energy
intensive process. If higher quality energy resources are no longer available, and the use of lower
quality resources is to be expanded by applying more capital inputs to their exploitation, then
the relative energy (output) to capital (input) price movement will have to be consistent with this
expansion. A three good economy is therefore of the minimum complexity required to investigate
this issue, and given the feedbacks between available energy resources and economy wide prices, a
general equilibrium approach is appropriate.
In the theoretical natural resource economics literature, natural resource scarcity is accom-
panied by a rise in their price. This leads to fairly sanguine conclusions with regards to the
exhaustion of non-renewable resources. Since Hotelling (1931), the defining characteristic of the
optimal depletion of non-renewable resources is that resource prices should rise at a rate related
to the rate that can be earned by extraction and investing the financial proceeds. This rising price
ensures that resources that are initially unprofitable to exploit eventually become profitable, and
that there are incentives both to economise on the use of the resources and to develop alternatives.
This foundation to the literature has subsequently been built upon, e.g. Holland (2008) describes
models of resource extraction that generate a peak in the extraction rate during the extraction
period using a partial equilibrium approach (since interest rates and backstop prices do not depend
upon energy used in the aggregate economy); Dasgupta and Heal (1974) extend The Hotelling’s
framework to a general equilibrium setting without changing the conclusion that non-renewable
resource prices rise without bound as they become more scarce; and Aghion, Howitt, Brant-Collett,
and Garcaia-Peanalosa (1998) describe a two sector general equilibrium model in which growth can
be sustained despite declining availability of non-renewable natural resources, that are essential for
production, through investment in intellectual capital. In all these cases, natural resource scarcity
is accompanied by a rise in their price. Holland claims that price movements will be smoothly
increasing because “oil is virtually costless to store in its natural reservoir ... even completely my-
opic firms without secure property rights would wait to produce from these [higher cost] deposits
until the price were high enough to cover the extraction costs”. This statement reveals, I believe,
a possible shortcoming in this approach: yes, the resources can be left in the ground at zero cost,
but there is no guarantee that the intermediate goods which are used to extract these resources
36
will be reasonably priced in future. It may be the case that as resources become scarce, the price
of intermediates rises faster than energy prices, and so lower quality energy resources can never be
profitably exploited.
The model presented in this paper has several distinctive features. A muti-sector economy is
necessary in order for endogenous energy sector input prices, and heterogenous energy resource
quality is necessary since we need a marginal firm who decides to produce or to exit. However,
the analysis reveals that economies of scale in the intermediate goods sector play a crucial role
in determining how the economy responds to declining availability of energy resources: Constant
returns, or a low level of increasing returns, are consistent with energy scarcity causing energy prices
to rise faster than the prices of intermediates, and so for the economy to profitably expand into
lower quality energy resources; However, if the degree of returns to scale in the intermediate goods
sector is strong enough then the reduction in this sector’s productivity, caused by the restriction
in its factor inputs, boosts the price of intermediates by more than the price of energy. The supply
of energy therefore contracts rather than expands at the margin, and eventually the economy can
collapse.
Models with increasing returns are widespread in other fields e.g. economic geography models
with agglomeration effects; business cycle models with increasing returns as a partial explanations
for size of fluctuations; endogenous growth models; and new-trade models of intra-industry trade.
The mechanism used in this paper and which is common to many papers in the literature is
well described in Ventura (2005)1 in which the cost of final goods production is falling in the
number of inputs (increasing returns to scale), but the number of inputs depends on demand
from producers of final goods. In Ventura (2005), this leads to a multiplicity of equilibrium
locations chosen by industrial sectors. In this paper we see the same non-linear effect as the cost
of energy production is falling in the productivity of intermediate inputs, but the productivity of
intermediate input production depends on demand from energy producers (increasing returns to
scale), which is partially determined by the quality of available energy resources. This interaction
between possible increasing returns to scale and energy resource limitations has not previously been
considered, and it is easy to imagine that it may be important. For example perhaps the ability
and profitability of deep oil drilling is only possible because there is a full manufacturing supply
chain that is predicated on the existence of automobile and aerospace industries. Perhaps if there
was no cheap oil available, the contraction of the automobile and aerospace sectors could affect the
manufacturing supply chain in such a way as to drastically increase costs/decrease productivity
in the sector that manufactures equipment for deep oil drilling. This in turn may mean that,
without cheap oil sustaining the automobile and aerospace sectors, the deep water drilling sector
is unprofitable, and so it would not exist in cheap oil’s absence.
1Section 3.2 of Ventura (2005).
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Given that a large intermediate sector lowers the cost of energy production, whilst a high level
of energy production enables a large intermediate sector; the model here presents the possibility
for development to go into reverse as this dependence, combined with the loss of energy resources,
causes this productive equilibrium to be destabilised. This is suggestive of “The Big Push” story
of economic development of Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishny (1989), in which coordinated industrial
investment can make such investment profitable (when an investment at the margin would have
been unprofitable) through the impact that the coordinated investment has on scale and efficiency.
However, in Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishny (1989), endowments are constant and development is a
coordination problem; whereas here I explicitly consider a decline (through resource depletion) in
the endowment, such that the industrial equilibrium is destabilised2 i.e. the issue here is the very
existence of equilibrium rather than the need to coordinate on a better equilibrium.
The contribution that this article makes is to draw attention to the possibility that price move-
ments in response to scarcity may not be favourable to bringing on substitutes or for using capital
intensive but energy efficient alternatives, a possibility which is not considered in the existing lit-
erature. The paper is structured as follows: section 2 introduces the macroeconomy and section 3
presents some propositions which capture the mechanism underlying the basic argument presented.
The energy sector in section 2 & 3 is completely abstract and has a very simple characterisation.
Section 4 presents a specific ‘Renewable Energy ’ model which satisfies the characterisation of the
energy sector given in section 2. Section 5 does likewise with a ‘Fossil Fuel ’ sector. Section 6
presents some illustrative results from the model, section 7 discusses the interaction between con-
clusions from this model and the incentives to innovate with policy implications, and section 8
concludes.
2 The macroeconomy
Households and the final goods sector in this model are standard. Final goods are produced using
a constant returns, Cobb-Douglas technology, under perfect competition, using energy services,
2And I further do not have the “cottage” sector of Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishny (1989) to sustain output if
there is no industrial sector.
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t = Ct + K̇t + δKt = wtLt + pK(t)Kt +Πt
where Yt ≡ output flow at time t
at ≡ TFP at time t
Lt ≡ Labour inputs at time t
Et ≡ Energy inputs at time t
Qt ≡ Intermediate good inputs at time t
Ct ≡ Consumption at time t
Kt ≡ Capital stock at time t
wt ≡Wage rate at time t
pK(t) ≡ Rental rate of capital at time t
Πt ≡ Energy sector profit flow rate at time t
µ ≡ Income share paid to energy
γ ≡ Income share paid to intermediates
δ ≡ Capital depreciation rate





t (where A ≡ atL
1−µ−γ
t = const). Households have CRRA preferences, and maximise
lifetime utility taking the paths of wages, rental rates of capital and energy sector profits as given.




pK(t)− δ − ρ
ǫ
where ρ ≡ rate of time preference
ǫ ≡ coefficient of relative risk aversion
An interest rate, pK(t), less (greater) than ρ + δ implies that consumption is falling (rising), and




t − δKt implies that capital stock is falling (rising).
















There are two further sectors in this economy: an energy sector which uses intermediate goods
to access energy resources and supply energy services; and an intermediate goods sector which
rents the capital stock and produces intermediate goods. The properties that we place on the
energy sector in this section and the next are that:
Et = f(QE(t)) = E(zt, st) ≥ 0
QE(t) = QE(zt, st) ≥ 0
where QE(t) is the quantity of intermediate goods used
f is the energy from intermediates production function
zt is the energy to intermediates price ratio, taken as given








∃zmin(st) s.t. E(zmin(st), st) = QE(zmin(st), st) = 0
dzmin(st)
dst














t , 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
lim
z→zmin




This is a fairly general specification for an energy sector, with output (and demand for inputs)
increasing in the relative price of energy output to intermediates input, energy output increasing in
the energy quality index, and with some simple regularity assumptions on the limiting behaviour
at high and low price ratios. This general specification is sufficient to generate the phenomena
described in this article, but two specific, not so general, details are required in order to observe
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these results. The first feature is price taking behaviour. This model assumes infinitesimal profit
maximising firms who take prices as given. In these circumstances, the firms cannot internalise
the effects of their supply decisions on economy wide prices. This is crucial and trivially important
when elucidating a flaw in the allocation that may arise from a decentralised market: we would
see nothing interesting if we analysed the social planner’s solution (as was done in e.g. Dasgupta
and Heal (1974) in their general equilibrium Hotellings model) or if we analysed the solution with
a monopoly energy supplier.
The other important specific feature that this energy sector must exhibit is a minimum price
for its output relative to its inputs at which it is willing to produce a positive quantity. The specific
combination of price taking (which implies infinitesimal firms and decreasing returns to scale) and
a minimum price at which these firms are willing to operate, calls for fixed costs in order to prevent
productivity rising without bound as the scale of production goes to zero. This seems reasonable
in context since it would seem that fixed costs are a realistic feature in the energy industry: the
output of oil from the application of a very small quantity of deep water drilling equipment is not
high, with decreasing returns to additional units of equipment, rather it is likely to be zero because
these additional units of equipment are essential; likewise the output from a wind or solar farm
that is disconnected from the grid is zero or very small, and the output from a wind turbine blade
or silicon wafer in the absence of the rest of the components is definitely zero.
Finally it is important to note that whilst these features for the energy industry are necessary in
order to see the phonomena described in this paper, the phenoma are not a necessary consequence
of these features. It is not the case that describing a price taking energy industry with fixed costs
is equivalent to assuming the results presented. We shall see that there is a large parameter region
in which results are standard, and the interesting new results are a only exhibited in the presence
of a sufficient degree of scale economies in the intermediate goods sector.
The intermediate goods sector is zero profit making, and rents capital stock to create interme-
diate goods. We write the intermediate goods production function as:
Qt +QE(t) = θK
ψ
t , ψ ≥ 1 (1)
where ψ determines the degree of returns to scale. θ is a normalisation parameter. Zero profits
implies:
pQ(t)(Qt +QE(t)) = pK(t)Kt





There is some evidence to suggest that manufacturing industries behave as if they are subject
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to increasing returns to scale. Hall (1989) explains the correlation of factor productivity with
exogenous demand shocks using increasing returns and finds that increasing returns are particularly
evident in the aggregate economy and in manufacturing sectors. Caballero and Lyons (1989) split
the returns to scale evident in the aggregate economy into internal, firm level, constant or decreasing
returns to scale, and positive external returns to scale. Their best estimate of the degree of scale
economies in the US is that a sector which increases its inputs by 10% will see an increase in output
of 8%, but if the whole economy increases its inputs by 10% then output will rise by 13%3. Basu
and Fernald (1997) explain similar data as Caballero and Lyons (1989) as a reallocation effect
towards more efficient firms rather than any real increasing returns at the micro-level, but agree
that if we model the aggregate economy as a representative firm then increasing returns to scale
are appropriate.
To simplify the analysis I consider only steady states of this economy. The consumption Euler
equation implies that in steady state the rental rate of capital is a constant given by:
p∗K = ρ+ δ (3)
If rental rates are below this steady state rate, then households will be reducing their holdings of
capital by saving at a rate that implies overall capital stocks are falling. Whilst if rental rates are
above this steady state rate, then households will be increasing their holdings of capital by saving
at a rate that implies overall capital stocks are rising. Equation (2) can be used to give a further
condition on the rental rate of capital as a function of the energy to intermediates price ratio that
can pin down the steady state of the whole economy, where we now drop the time subscripts to
indicate that we consider only steady states of the economy:











Clearly we always have pK(z, s) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ [zmin,∞) and, by monotonicity of E(z, s) and QE(z, s)
with respect to z, pK(z, s) is continuous over this set.
3i.e. in the notation of equation (1), this translates as ψ ∼ 1.3 (ignoring the fact that capital services are only
a subset of the whole economy, which is also subject to diseconomies of scale caused by declining energy resource
quality). In the empirical trade exercise of Mohler and Seitz (2010), the elasticity of substitution in the CES import
demand systems of European economies is found to lie in the range 3 - 5, which corresponds to a returns to scale
parameter, ψ ∈ (1.25, 1.5)
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3 Steady State Equilibrium
Given some energy quality s, the intersections of the equation (4) with the constant steady state
value given by equation (3) defines steady state values, z∗. In this section I show that the param-
eter space for this economy can be divided into three: one parameter region that correspond to
the common understanding of how prices respond to scarcity; one parameter region that can be
dismissed as unrealistic, and one interesting new region that is the contribution of this paper.
Proposition 1. Trivially, K = 0 is a steady state since, given zero capital stock, production and
so investment is zero.
Proposition 2. For any given capital stock, K > 0, the market equilibrium exists and is unique.
























z ∈ (zmin(s),∞) represents all possible price ratios that are associated with positive output from
the energy sector. Clearly K(z) is a bijection on z > zmin(s) and so a given capital stock, K, will
imply a particular price, z, by equation (4)4. There are therefore no problems of interpretation
with a multiplicity of equilibria (though as we shall see, there may be multiple steady states). This
monotone relationship between K and z, as well as the relationship already derived, Equation 4,
between pK and z, allows us to construct phase diagrams in (K,C) space based on the consumption
Euler equation and the equation of motion for capital. First however, we need to characterise how
Equation 4 behaves for different values of ψ.
Proposition 3. ∃ψ∗∗ > 1 such that ψ > ψ∗∗ ⇒ pK(z, s) → ∞ as z → ∞ and ψ < ψ
∗∗ ⇒
pK(z, s)→ 0 as z →∞.
4Note that this is a statement for all K, not just at the steady state K implied by the parameters of the model
and by the energy quality index s. The renewables energy sector of section 4 has no energy sector dynamics and so
this proposition holds whether or not the macroeconomy has settled into its steady state. However, the fossil fuel
energy sector of section 5 has only had its price quantity relationships analysed assuming that it faces constant (i.e.
steady state) prices. Therefore the signs of the partial derivatives of E and QE for this sector, although they are
positive with respect to z as required, have strictly only been evaluated at steady state.
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We can evaluate ψ∗∗ by taking limits of equation (4):








































as z →∞ ⇐⇒ γ − 1 + x
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Proposition 4. ∃ψ∗ ∈ (1, ψ∗∗) such that ψ > ψ∗ ⇒ pK(z, s) → 0 as z → zmin and ψ < ψ
∗ ⇒
pK(z, s)→∞ as z → zmin.
We can evaluate ψ∗ by taking limits of equation (4):






























Whilst these propositions only strictly allow us to characterise pK(z, s) as z → zmin or z →∞,
the function would have to be very strange to have many turning points. If we make a further
regularity assumption (that will be true for the results presented in section 6) that there is at most
one turning point, then we can describe the economy as a function of the degree of returns to scale
in the intermediate goods sector:
• ψ > ψ∗∗ Super Strong Increasing Returns to Scale (SSIRS). Since pK → 0 as z → zmin,
pK → ∞ as z → ∞, and given the assumption of a maximum of one turning point, then it
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must be the case that pK(z, s) is monotonically increasing in z. Therefore it will only cross
the steady state value of p∗K once (from below) at z
∗ > zmin. Given that K(z) is a bijection,
there is a single (unstable & repulsive) steady state K∗ > 0. Equation (4) is graphed for this
extreme case of SSIRS in figure 3.1. No stable productive economy (i.e. Y ∗ > 0) exists even
with maximal energy resources availability. K∗ = 0 is stable and attractive since as K → 0
the rental rates paid to capital become insufficient for households to want to save enough to
prevent the capital stock decaying away. Returns to scale are too strong for any this model
to describe any sensible economic system and we do not consider this case further.
Figure 3.1: SSIRS: two steady states - a stable state at K∗ = 0 and a higher unstable state.
Figure 3.2: Phase diagram for SSIRS, showing the unstable steady state, K∗ > 0, in (K,C) space
• 1 ≤ ψ < ψ∗ Weakly Increasing (or Constant) Returns to Scale (WIRS). Since pK → ∞ as
z → zmin and pK → 0 as z → ∞, and given the assumption of a maximum of one turning
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point, then it must be the case that pK(z, s) is monotonically decreasing in z. Therefore it will
only cross the steady state value of p∗K once (from above) at z
∗ > zmin. Given that K(z) is a
bijection, there is a single (stable & attractive) steady state K∗ > 0. Equation (4) is graphed
for WIRS in figure 3.3. K∗ = 0 is unstable and repulsive since as K → 0 the rental rates paid
to capital become very large and households to want to save and accumulate capital. This
economy accords with our intuitions: a productive economy (Y ∗ > 0) always exists and the
response of the economy to a fall in energy quality is for the value of zmin to rise, the whole
pK curve to shift to the right, and the equilibrium energy price to intermediates price to rise.
This relative energy price rise incentivises the full usage of energy resources by endogenously
bringing previously unprofitable marginal resources into use.
Figure 3.3: WIRS: two steady states - an unstable state at K∗ = 0 and a stable state at K∗ > 0.
Figure 3.4: Phase diagram for WIRS, showing the stable steady state, K∗ > 0, in (K,C) space
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• ψ∗ < ψ < ψ∗∗ Strong Increasing Returns to Scale (SIRS). Now have pK → 0 as z →
zmin and pK → 0 as z → ∞, with pK > 0, ∀z ∈ (zmin,∞). Given the assumption of a
maximum of one turning point, then there must indeed be a single turning point at z+(s)
given by ∂pK(z
+(s), s)/∂z = 0. K∗ = 0 is stable and attractive since as K → 0 the
rental rates paid to capital become insufficient for households to want to save enough to
prevent the capital stock decaying away. But, so long as pK(z
+(s), s) > pK∗ then there will
be another stable steady state at z∗ > z+ > zmin (corresponding to K
∗ > 0). Equation
(4) is graphed for SIRS in figure 3.5, showing this stable productive steady state. At the
productive equilibrium, this economy may look very similar to the WIRS economy, and may
respond to a fall in energy quality in a similar way with relative price rises endogenously
bringing previously unprofitable marginal resources into use. However, we cannot prove the
Figure 3.5: SIRS: may have three steady states: stable states at K∗ = 0 and K∗ > 0 with an
unstable state between.
existence of a non-zero steady state for SIRS. All we know here are the limiting properties
that limz→∞ pK(z, s) = limz→zmin pK(z, s) = 0, and that zmin →∞ as s→ 0. Therefore it is
possible that the graph for Equation (4) for the SIRS economy looks like that shown in figure
3.7, i.e. with a globally stable K∗ = 0 steady state. Indeed, we can experimentally construct
a particular SIRS economy then with a particular s = s1 such that the evaluated pK(z, s1)
function resembles figure 3.5. Then change the energy quality parameter to s = s2 < s1
such that the evaluated pK(z, s2) function resembles figure 3.7, i.e. there is a point in the s
parameter space at which the economy collapses as the K∗ > 0 steady state ceases to exist.
We can describe the transition from figure 3.5 to figure 3.7 as a collapse because there is
a discontinuity in the steady state that the economy can reach. Once we lower the energy
quality index, s, past a critical value, the steady state changes discontinuously from K∗ > 0
to K∗ = 0. This is unlike WIRS in which the economy exists at some positive level of
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Figure 3.6: A possible phase diagram for SIRS, with 2 steady states, K∗ > 0, the lower unstable
and the higher stable, in (K,C) space. Log scale used because lower steady state close to K = 0.
production, irrespective of the severity of the resource restrictions, s, that are imposed.
Figure 3.7: SIRS: may only have one stable steady state at K∗ = 0.
The intuition for what is going on here is straightforward: exploiting energy resources requires
intermediate goods as inputs and the scale of the energy sector will exogenously depend upon the
quality of resources available, and endogenously upon the relative output to input price. An fall in
energy quality is a supply shock to the energy sector which is felt throughout the whole economy.
In the absence of significant scale economies in intermediate good production, this supply shock
makes energy the scarce and hence expensive commodity, which mitigates the exogenous cause of
the problem which was the decline in energy quality. If however scale economies are important in
intermediate good production then as the economy contracts due to the effects of the exogenous
decline in energy quality, productivity falls by a lot in the intermediate goods sector. This means
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Figure 3.8: A possible phase diagram for SIRS. No steady states with K > 0 exists.
that intermediates become relatively scarce and expensive. The price effects move in the opposite
direction needed to mitigate the exogenous cause of the problem, this exacerbates the problem
by restricting energy production further. These effects multiply and eventually there is no energy
price and intermediate goods price which can simultaneously produce positive output from the
energy sector and allow the factors supplying the final goods sector to be paid their marginal
products, whilst paying capital at the steady state interest rate. In this circumstance, even in the
absence of any further declines in energy quality, the interest rate will be below the required rate
of return and the economy will run down its capital stock towards the zero capital stock, zero
production steady state.
4 A renewable energy sector
A model of some types of renewable energy is perfect for generating an energy sector whose
behaviour is consistent with the assumptions made in section 2 and which can be studied in steady
state. If the resources that are exploited are always there, i.e. next period’s resources are not
impacted by usage in this period, then there is no trade off across time that this sector needs
to make. It will take prices as given now, and make an optimal choice now; the future does not
matter. This describes resources like wind or solar resources available at a given site, and not
timber or other biomass which needs to be managed with a more lifecycle view. Therefore in the
subsequent discussion, read ‘resources’ perhaps as location specific wind speed or solar flux. It is
appropriate to model such resources as being subject to decreasing returns to scale since there is a
limit to the energy we can extract from a single location, no matter how much capital we deploy at
that location. As previously discussed, it is natural that there is some fixed costs in for operating in
any particular location: inada conditions leading to super-productive but miniscule factor inputs
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are unrealisitic. For any given set of prices, the best resources will be more profitable to exploit
than more marginal resources. As the energy to intermediates price rises, more intermediates will
be used exploiting a given resource, and marginal resources that previously were not exploited will
now be brought into use.
Energy resources are owned by households who auction the right to exploit these resources to
a continuum, [e,∞), of potential energy firms. The households therefore extract all the surplus
and own the profit stream that the firms produce. The resulting energy market is competitive (i.e.
price taking) with a continuum of differentiated firms, j ∈ [e,∞), each producing homogenous
output, Ej using intermediate goods Qj in a decreasing returns to scale production function that
also exhibits costs indexed by j i.e. “high j” firms are exploiting poorer quality energy resources
than “low j” firms and so, for a given quantity of inputs, Qj, they produce a lower quantity, Ej of
outputs. The production function is:
Ej = Q
β
j − j , β ∈ (0, 1)




This is independent of j i.e. all energy firms use the same quantity of inputs. Therefore profits
and energy output are both decreasing in j. j is endogenously defined on [e, r] where e = 1/s > 0
is the exogenous parameter representing the highest quality energy resources available, whilst r is
an endogenous variable that is defined by πr = 0 i.e. there is free entry in the energy sector and
firms continue to enter, making positive profits, until the marginal firm makes zero profits. This
gives:
r = Qβj (1− β) = (βz)
β
1−β (1− β)
The total inputs and outputs from the energy sector are calculated by summing over the firms

































The energy sector uses intermediate goods, and its output responds endogenously to the rela-
tionship between the output energy price and the input intermediates price. High quality resources
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are those which require low inputs per unit of energy produced whereas low quality resources re-
quire higher inputs per unit of energy produced. There is no limit imposed upon energy availability,
however these unlimited resources will be of increasingly poor quality. If it is optimal to exploit
a particular resource, then it is optimal to exploit every resource of higher quality, and so the
available high quality resources are always exploited. Exploitation of lower quality resources is an
increasing function of the energy to intermediates price ratio.
Appendix 1 shows that this renewables energy sector satisfies the properties of the generic
energy sector specified in section 2 and hence that the aggregate economy should have the steady
state behaviour of section 3. Section 6 uses this renewables energy sector to generate illustrative
results for the economy under regimes of constant, weakly increasing, and strongly increasing
returns to scale in the intermediate goods sector.
5 A fossil fuel energy sector
In a Hotelling model of non-renewable resource extraction, the owners of the resources face a trade
off between extracting and supplying these resources to market, and leaving the resources in the
ground and seeing their price rise. Optimal extraction equates the value of these options, and the
basic result is that as a finite resource is extracted, its price should rise to compensate those owners
who do not extract immediately. This prediction of a rising price is at odds with the observed
price history of non-renewable resources, and some economists e.g. Barnett and Morse (1963), and
Simon (1996), have concluded that this price history is evidence of declining rather than increasing
scarcity of energy resources. The explanation for this is usually technological advances. However,
Hamilton (2011) details the history of global crude oil production over the last century and a
half and finds that the production increases have been achieved mainly through the exploitation
of new geographic areas, rather than predominantly through technological advances as applied to
existing sources. As the scope for adding to production from new geographical areas declines, the
suggestion is that the era of rising production could soon end. There are two effects going on:
depletion and technological progress; and there is some dispute about which of these effects is
“winning”.
A set of data that is broadly consistent with Hamilton’s interpretation is the energy return
on energy invested (EROI) for fossil fuels over the past century (see figure 5.1). EROI can be
considered as a technologically adjusted index of the cost of obtaining energy resources. So for
example oil and gas from 1930 had an EROI of (greater than) 100 : 1 and so obtaining 100boe
(barrels of oil equivalent) required spending energy (including the energy embodied in the capital
used to extract the energy) that contained ∼ 1boe so that gross energy production would have
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had to be ∼ 101boe to supply the final economy with this 100boe. By 2005 oil and gas EROI
was ∼ 15 : 1 and supplying the final economy with 100boe would have required gross energy
production of ∼ 107boe. This increase in the cost of supplying the same amount of energy comes
despite improvements in technology over the period. Extracting deep water oil in 1930 would not
have cost an extra 6% over the oil that was being extracted at that time, rather it would not have
been possible at all with the technology available. It is in this sense that EROI can be said to be
a technologically adjusted index of the cost of obtaining these resources, and this data suggests
that, even allowing for technological advances, the resources that we are extracting are becoming
more costly.
Figure 5.1: Figure from Murphy and Hall (2010)
However, the total resource of fossil fuels is massive, though of increasingly poor quality. There
are enormous quantities of low quality fossil fuel resources, like shale gas, tar sands and brown
coal. Figure 5.2 shows that we are a long way from any limits in the availability of fossil fuel re-
sources, notwithstanding any efforts on our part to leave some resources unused because of climate
change concerns. Energy resources with higher costs of production (and/or low EROI) tend to be
more capital intensive. As an illustrative example we can consider the wooden derricks used for
Pennsylvanian oil production in the 19th century against the deep water drilling rigs used today
in places like the Gulf of Mexico; or we can compare the pick and shovels used for easily accessible
coal seams, to the machinery required for mountain top removal in the Appalachian Mountains.
This low quality / high input requirement accords with the intuitive definition of energy quality
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used in this article. Nuclear energy can also be viewed similarly with finite resources of uranium,
but potentially massive resources if ‘breeder’ reactors are used to recycle the fuel. Again, breeder
technology is more expensive and so can be viewed as ‘lower quality’ in this context. When com-
bined with the possibility of technological advances that lower the cost, and effectively raise the
quality, of currently unprofitable marginal resources, these non-renewable resources start to look
like renewable resources, with a regeneration rate related to the rate of technological progress.
This is clearly wrong in the limit, but it may be a good approximation to the fossil fuel energy
resources over the next several centuries, and to nuclear energy resources over an even longer term.
Figure 5.2: Adapted from Brandt and Farrell (2007) by Murphy (2011). Shows resources with their
production cost. Proven reserves are dark bands on left, uncertain resources are lighter bands on
right.
Given the expectation then (at least from some people) that technology may be sufficient to
keep depletion at bay over the medium (and maybe even over the long) term, and the dispute about
whether the evidence of the 20th century is consistent with this expectation, we construct a steady
state Hotellings model of a fossil fuel energy sector in which technological progress and depletion
are exactly offset, using the standard framework (see e.g. Beltratti, Chichilnisky, and Heal (1998))
for the lifecycle management of renewable resources like forests and fisheries. At steady state,
these resources will again be characterised by an energy quality state variable, and we treat the
highest quality as a parameter and endogenously allow the exploitation of lower quality resources
up to a zero profit limiting case for the marginal resource. The intellectual experiment that is then
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explored is how economies with a different level of highest energy quality available compare with
each other.
Again, households own a continuum of energy firms, each indexed by j. Firms j exploits
resources labelled Sj by applying inputs Qj to produce a homogenous good Ej, taking prices as
given. There are fixed costs related to the remaining size of the resource that the firm exploits
(the rationale being that if high quality resources are exploited first then a large stock means there
are high quality resources available, whereas a small stock implies only the poor quality resources
remain). The production function and profit flows are given by:
Ej(t) = (Qj(t)− Sj(t)














In the renewable stock model, the regeneration rate of the stock is related to the current size of the
stock. The simplest analytical way to avoid cornucopian solutions where the stock grows without
bound is to have a quadratic equation of motion for the stock:
Ṡj(t) = gj1Sj(t)− g2Sj(t)
2 − Ej(t)
Firms maximise lifetime profits taking prices as given subject to this resource constraint. Profits
are discounted at the rate of return available on capital, rt = pK(t)− δ. The Hamiltonian of their
maximisation problem is therefore:














= (rt − gj1 + 2g2Sj(t))πE(j, t)− πS(j, t)
Without further assumptions it is difficult to go any further. If however we assume constant prices
then we can describe the behaviour of firms in the fossil fuel sector by the coupled differential
equations (where the time subscripts remain only because the current value of production and the
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current value of the stock may be time varying, prices are constant though):





((ρ− gj1 + 2g2Sj(t))πE(j, t)− πS(j, t))
ρ− gj1 + 2g2Sj(t) > 0 (for finite lifetime value)
Substituting in for the partial derivatives of the profit function, the Ṡ = 0 and Ė = 0 loci are given
by the equations:
Ṡ = 0 ⇒ E = gj1S − g2S
2













Because the profit flow tends to minus infinity as the stock tends to zero, the lifetime profit stream
associated with the path that leads to steady state is valued more highly than any paths that
involve depleting the resource5. The system is therefore saddlepath stable, with a phase diagram
of the form shown in Figure 5.3.
There can be more than one steady state for a firm in this economy. (In Figure 5.3, lowering
z would lower the vertical asymptote of the Ė = 0 locus, without changing the Ṡ = 0 locus. This
could lead to 3 steady states, with the actual steady state achieved being a function of the initial
state.) However, this is perhaps taking the setup of this model too literally. If we were to use
this literal interpretation, then we could not talk about the energy quality as a parameter: the
energy quality would be an endogenous variable; the primitive parameters are gj1 and g2 which
describe how the resources regenerate. The point of this exercise is not to construct a theory
of the equilibrium output of a firm supplying fossil fuels given fundamental primitives, rather it
is to show that a fossil fuel sector can be broadly consistent with the properties of the abstract
energy sector laid in in Section 2. Therefore, from now on we treat Sj as a parameter that is a
property of the firm operating at this level of energy quality, and so implicitly, gj1 is a variable
that ‘adjusts to keep Sj constant’. The actual parameter that is relevant on an economy wide basis
is s = max (Sj : ∀j) and we allow firms with Sj < s to enter until the marginal firm makes zero
profits. We can state, by assumption, that s is such that all the firms j exploiting energy resources
with quality Sj ∈ (Smin, s) have a unique steady state (with a phase diagram of the form of Figure
5.3) and the position of this steady state is a smooth function of parameters and prices. Given this
set up it is important to reiterate the intellectual exercise that is being undertaken: we compare
5Although paths with a cycle of resource overuse followed by shut-down and regeneration have not strictly been
ruled out.
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Figure 5.3: Phase diagram for fossil fuel firm, managing its resources under constant prices.
economies with different levels of s, the highest quality available energy. For s2 < s1 the discussion
is framed as if s2 is the same economy as s1 but after some energy quality shock. However the firms
occupying a particular energy quality location, Sj are not the same firms (if we assume that the
primitive parameters of an individual firm are constant): conditional on gj1 a rise in z produces a
slight leftwards shift of the Ė = 0 locus, and strongly raises its vertical asymptote. In many cases
this would produce a fall in Ej. However, when we transform Sj into a parameter that is invariant
with respect to prices, we get a well behaved steady state quantity Ej as a function of prices and
parameters (including Sj)
6:










S−αj = 0 (5)
In Appendix 2, as part of proving that this fossil fuel sector satisfies the requirements of the abstract
energy sector set out in section 2, it is shown that this relationship implies that the output, Ej, of
a firm operating at energy quality, Sj, is an increasing function of the price, z.
The marginal firm in this sector will be the firm that places zero value of operating or not
6Just to repeat though, the firm operating at Sj in the economy characterised by s2 is not the same firm that
operated at Sj in the economy characterised by s1.
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operating. Since we are only discussing the steady states of the production of these firms then the
zero value condition is the same as the zero profit flow condition i.e. for any given price level, z,

























Where Emin is related to Smin by Equation (5). The aggregate energy sector consists of a continuum






























It can be shown that Smin is a decreasing function of z and so again we have a price taking
energy sector that uses intermediate goods such that its output responds endogenously to the
relationship between the output energy price and the input intermediates price. Exploitation of
lower quality resources is an increasing function of the energy to intermediates price ratio. If it
is optimal to exploit a particular resource, then it is optimal to exploit every resource of higher
quality, and so the available high quality resources are always exploited. Appendix 2 shows that
this fossil fuel energy sector satisfies the properties of the generic energy sector specified in section
2 and hence that the aggregate economy has the steady state behaviour of section 3.
Finally, we consider the behaviour of an infinitesimal (so does not affect the rest of the economy),
price taking fossil fuel firm managing a truely non renewable resource. What are the incentives
for such a firm as the aggregate economy operates at progressively lower levels of energy quality
(though always in the neighbourhood of the steady state if it exists7)? With constant or weakly
increasing returns to scale in the intermediate goods sector, the firm will expect increasing profits
(per unit extracted from a given quality of resource) and so will tend to defer extracting resources.
Any resources that are not profitable to extract now, will become profitable to extract as the energy
7i.e. we consider some exogenous dynamic process for st such that ṡt < 0, zt ≈ z
∗(st) and rt ≈ ρ. This putative
infinitesimal non renewable resource firm then manages its finite stock of resources under a variable price regime,
but the problem is now tractable because it is partial equilibrium since its decisions do not feed back into the
economy-wide prices.
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quality exploited in the rest of the economy declines. This is in keeping with the sanguine view
of non renewable resource economics since Hotelling. However, with strongly increasing returns to
scale in the intermediate goods sector, the firm will expect decreasing profits (per unit extracted
from a given quality of resource) and so will tend to bring forward the extraction of resources.
Any resources that are not profitable to extract now, will never become profitable to extract as
the energy quality exploited in the rest of the economy declines. This is a new result not at
all in keeping with the usual picture from the non renewable resource literature in economics.
Eventually if the economy can no longer maintain a steady state, the interest rate will fall below
the rate of time preference. In this circumstance there is some incentive for profitable firms to
defer extracting resources since, even though profits (per unit extracted from a given quality of
resource) are decreasing, the value placed on future profits is rising as the interest rate falls. It
remains the case however that currently unprofitable resources will never be brought ’on-stream’.
6 Illustrative Results
In this section I present illustrative results generated from the model described in sections 2, 3
& 4 i.e. the full macroeconomy with a renewable energy sector. These results illustrate the the
mechanism described, but strong increasing returns to scale is contingent upon an extreme param-
eterisation. To see if it is possible that the phenomena described in this article have any possibility
of being quantitatively important, I extend the intermediate goods sector to a monopolistically
competitive industry with symmetric firms making heterogenous intermediate goods by renting
the capital stock and consuming energy services (i.e. two inputs as opposed to the single input of
capital stock in the basic model). These heterogenous goods are aggregated for use in the energy
sector and the final goods sector using Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation. This generalised model embeds
the basic model8 and exhibits the same phenomena (but clearly the propositions derived in section
3 only strictly apply to the basic model).
The results are presented here as plots of the steady state value of the index, r, of the marginal,
zero profit, energy firm against the energy quality parameter (which is the index of the energy
firm exploiting the highest quality resources), e = 1/s. Therefore an increase in e on the x-axis
corresponds to a reduction in energy quality, and so this is a plot of a comparative static (at
steady state) across a continuum of different economies, each having a different energy quality
parameter. Different lines on the plot show this comparative static for economies with different
levels, ψ, of scale economies in their intermediate goods sectors. The normalisation constant, θ,
8The basic model is isomorphic to the generalised model with an elasticity of intermediate sector output with
respect to energy equal to zero. However, the generalised model has been set up in a more specific, less general,
way, with the microfoundations of monopolistic competition under CES aggregation, rather than just assuming zero
profits.
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in the intermediate goods sector production function is chosen as a function of the degree of scale
economies, θ = θ(ψ), so that for e = 0 (i.e. s → ∞) the steady state values for the endogenous
variables in the model are independent of the level of scale economies, ψ (and therefore the lines
on the plot start from a common value, r0 at e = 0) so that the results can be compared on a
single plot. If the index of the marginal firm rises (i.e. lower quality resources are exploited) as e
rises (i.e. as energy quality falls) then relative energy prices are rising with falling energy quality
and the exploitation of lower quality resources expands to (partially) offset the loss of the high
quality resources. However, if r falls as e rises then relative energy prices are falling with falling
energy quality, and the economy is heading for collapse (in the sense discussed in section 3). This
is shown in Figure 6.1 which charts how the steady state of the economy varies with ψ and e.
Figure 6.1 does not show timepaths, but we can imagine that if a specific ψ line shows the path
of an economy which undergoes a series of depletion shocks9, then a rising r(e) curve indicates
that the use of lower quality resources substitutes for the high quality resources that are no longer
available to the economy. A falling r(e) curve indicates that marginal resources are abandoned as
high quality resources cease to be available. The parameters used to generate these results, and
the results from the following section, are listed in Appendix 3.
Figure 6.1: r(e) for 3 economies: CRS with ψ = 1, WIRS with 1 < ψ < ψ∗, and SIRS with ψ > ψ∗.
Under SIRS, we observe that, initially, the (infinitely) abundant low quality resources provide
a substitute for unavailable high quality resources. Eventually as e continues to rise, the r(e) curve
9With a point on the graph only generated once the economy has converged to steady state following each
depletion shock.
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has a turning point and as e rises further the economy starts to abandon the marginal resources
despite their abundance, and ultimately the economy collapses. This can be seen more clearly by
zooming into figure 6.1 as is shown in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: As Figure 6.1 but zoomed in.
These results are somewhat unsatisfactory since proposition 4 gives us that ψ∗ = 1/(γ + µ).
This implies that, given standard estimates from incomes shares, ψ∗ ≈ 3 - vastly higher than any
plausible estimate of the degree of scale economies in the real world. Determining whether the
phenomena described in this article is an irrelevant feature which real world parameters do not
remotely approach, or whether it is worthy of investigating quantitatively, is the purpose of the
following model generalisation which essentially adds an energy input requirement to the operation
of the intermediate goods sector.
The intermediate goods sector is generalised by splitting it into two. A perfectly competi-
tive aggregation sector buys the output of a monopolistically competitive sector which produces












, σ > 1




The monopolistically competitive sector consists of measure n (endogenous) firms each producing a
differentiated good with some monopoly pricing power. The demand schedule that each monopolist
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faces, and their production and profit functions are:










πi = piqi − pEEi − ρKi
Where f is a fixed cost. There is free entry so the profits of each monopolist are driven to zero.






































The only other change from the model presented previously is that the total output of the energy
sector now has to be split across the final and intermediate goods sectors, E+EQ. The fixed cost,
f here performs normalisation role as the parameter θ in the basic model: defining f = f(σ) allows
us to normalise the economies with different σ’s so that they all coincide for e = 0. Simulating
this model (with the parameters detailed in Appendix 3) produces very similar results to the basic
model (see Figures 6.3 & 6.4) but now, as detailed in Appendix 3, the degree of returns to scale
needed for SIRS and collapse is much lower10 than in the basic model11. This suggests that the
SIRS mechanism is not obviously ruled out by the parameterisation needed to observe it, and so
this is a phenomenum that is worthy of quantitative investigation.
7 Policy & Innovation
The collapse of a SIRS economy as energy quality declines is due to prices and not to any funda-
mental limits. By construction, low quality resources are infinitely abundant, and a high relative
energy price will ensure that they are profitable to exploit. An energy subsidy will therefore bring
resources into production and will increase the scale of intermediates sector, improving the allo-
cation across the economy. The economy does not collapse under CRS, and the market allocation
10Depending of the value of the parameter η. The generalised model exhibits SIRS so long as σ < σ∗ =
1/((1− η)(1− µ− γ)) - see Appendix 4.
11The SIRS result, as described in Appendix 3, is generated with a returns to scale, ψ = 1.3 ⇐⇒ σ = 4.3333,
which is the number estimated by Caballero and Lyons (1989).
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Figure 6.3: r(e) for 3 economies: CRS, WIRS, & SIRS; from the generalised model.
Figure 6.4: As Figure 6.3 but zoomed in.
cannot be improved upon12. If we were to impose lump sum taxes on the households and use the
proceeds to subsidise energy production, then the pareto-optimal tax rate is zero for CRS and is
increasing in the degree of scale economies: the more at risk of collapse the economy is from the
interaction of increasing returns and energy quality, the more amenable this situation is to policy
12This follows from The First Welfare Theorem.
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intervention.
When we imagine technological solutions to energy scarcity, we often think of high technol-
ogy goods that use energy more efficiently. This is the situation that Aghion, Howitt, Brant-
Collett, and Garcaia-Peanalosa (1998) abstract from in their model of endogenous growth with
non-renewable resources. A real world example of this could be modern cars with computer op-
timised engines, as opposed to simpler vehicles that use petrol inputs much less efficiently. In
Aghion & Howitt’s model, as energy became scarce and expensive there was an increasing incen-
tive to develop this technology. However, in the model presented in this paper I suggest that, if
we live in a world of SIRS, then energy scarcity may not motivate us to use this advanced energy
efficient technology, because the price of the high-tech computer optimised capital goods could rise
by more than the price of energy, and consumers will substitute away from such goods towards
goods that use intermediates efficiently but energy inefficiently.
Specifically, we could formulate two alternative production technologies for final goods: an inter-
mediates intensive technology that uses energy very efficiently, and an energy intensive technology
that used intermediates efficiently. There would be some price ratio at which these technologies
used energy and capital services in the same ratio to produce the same output level, and this price
ratio would be the price ratio that the economy switched from one technology to the other. In the
results presented in Section 6, rising e always causes rising r in the WIRS economies, and causes
rising r in the SIRS economy initially. Rising r occurs because of a rising energy to intermediates
price. The switch price will eventually be reached for the WIRS economies and they will ultimately
use the energy efficient technology. The switch price may or may not be reached under SIRS, but
even supposing that it is, further declines in high quality energy availability could see the switch
price being reached again on the way down i.e. the SIRS economy may choose never to take up the
energy efficient technology, and even if the economy does adopt it, it may then abandon it. This is
intuitive - we can well imagine that productivity in advanced sectors depends on sufficient scale,
and if scale is hit hard enough by a shortage of energy, then advanced energy efficient products
may not be available.
The same issue arises for a putative backstop technology. We could suppose that some non-
depletable backstop was available at some relative energy price. For expositional purposes let us
suppose it is large scale deployment of solar panels in deserts. Again the productivity of the sectors
that can produce the solar technology depends upon the scale at which it operates. At low levels of
scarcity there is large demand for semiconductor technology so this sector is large and productive.
It appears that the solar backstop is feasible but the relative energy price is too low to justify its
deployment. Energy scarcity rises and energy prices rise (relative to wages). However intermediate
goods sectors across the economy contract and productivity falls. The pricing is such that despite
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the rise in energy prices, we are no closer to profitably deploying the backstop technology. The
economy eventually collapses for lack of energy, and at no point was it profitable to deploy the
backstop technology. The description here only applies to the SIRS economy, under WIRS, the
backstop technology will eventually be deployed.
In general, this story applies to any innovation effort that may allow an economy to grow or
continue at the same level under resource restrictions. If the benefits to innovating are positively
related to the energy price, but the costs are positively related to the intermediates price, then it
will eventually be optimal to undertake the innovation effort under WIRS. It may be the case that
it is never be optimal to undertake the innovation effort under SIRS. This problem is amenable
to policy intervention though: subsidies can support the scale of industry so that innovations or
technologies are within the reach of a SIRS economy, whereas they may be out of reach without
policy interventions. This is therefore (theoretical) support (though not necessarily support in any
specific case, or for our real world economy) for subsidies, e.g. renewables feed-in-tariffs, which
may create an industry of sufficient scale to be profitable.
8 Conclusion
I find that the price movements caused by declining energy resources may not be conducive to
the exploitation of more marginal resources. Such price movements can lead to macroeconomic
collapse, for lack of energy, before all the technologically available energy resources have been
exploited. This result is in contrast with the basic Hotellings model and almost all of the non-
renewable natural resources and energy literature. Increasing returns to scale, as estimated as
occurring in, and often assumed for, manufacturing sectors and industrial economies, is a sufficient
condition for this phenomena to be manifest. Innovative or technological solutions to future energy
shortages are also adversely affected by this phenomena. However, the more that this phenomena
is a real problem, the more it is amenable to policy intervention - which does allow society to
mitigate the problem through activist policy.
The mechanism underlying this interaction effect between scale economies and energy quality
is that energy supply decisions are positively related to the energy price, and negatively related to
input prices. Scale economies can cause productivity in the intermediate sectors, that manufacture
inputs for the energy sector, to fall as their scale falls. This can mean that an energy quality shock,
which is a supply shock to the whole economy, causes the supply of intermediates to fall by more
than the energy supply, and so the scarce commodity is the intermediates. Hence the energy price
rise is less than the intermediates price rise and energy sector profitability falls. The existing
literature only considers the positive relationship of energy supply with the energy price, and does
64
not consider intermediate inputs at all.
This mechanism may be quantitatively important: the recent experience of historically high
energy prices (likely caused by the supply of high quality, low marginal cost, oil resources failing
to rise to match rising demand, predominantly from China, see e.g. Kilian and Murphy (2010))
has not led to a uniform pursuit of alternative energy resources. Renewables investment has been
volatile13, worldwide nuclear electricity generation has seen absolute declines14, and for OECD
countries the recent experience of high energy prices is associated with demand destruction rather
than supply increases15. Obviously there are multiple reasons for these outcomes such as the
short run demand side effects of the global financial crisis, as well as policy decisions due to the
Fukushima disaster. However, along with high energy prices there have also been some price
increases in the industries which supply the renewable energy industry due to higher commodity
costs and supply bottlenecks16. Energy sector costs rising with the energy price, such that the
profitability of marginal suppliers not necessarily improving with a scarcity induced rise in the
energy price, is the basic mechanism underlying this article; and so real world experience may be
consistent with the phenomena described by this paper.
Future research must develop techniques for testing whether the interaction of scale economies
and energy quality is quantitatively important. What are the returns to scale of real manufac-
turing sectors, especially of those sectors which supply components for extrative industries? Do,
for example, growth accounting exercises suggest that we live in a world of constant or weakly
increasing returns to scale, or do we live in a world of strongly increasing returns to scale?
13See e.g. The GWEC (2011).
14See e.g. EPI (2012).
15From EIA (2012) OECD petroleum consumption fell by 10% from 2007 to 2011.
16See figure 0.3 of EWEA (2009) which shows cost reductions from 1987 to 2004 as technology improved, with
cost increases for the final data point in 2006.
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A Appendix 1: The renewable energy sector satisfies re-
quirements of section 2
































< 0 ⇐⇒ dzmin(e)
de
> 0 (since e = s−1) and zmin →∞ as e→∞.
Proof. zmin is defined by the marginal firm being the only firm i.e. r(zmin) = (1− β)(βz)
β
1−β = e,













Plugging this expression into the equations for E and QE gives zero as required (though this is by
definition), and we can immediately see that zmin is an increasing function of e and that zmin →∞
as e→∞.



























































































Proposition A. 1. 4. limz→∞E = a(e)z
x, x ≥ 0







1−β , so x = 2β
1−β



























So b(e) = 2β
1+β
and y = 1 ∈ [0, 1].





















































1−β , with g(zmin) = 0, and c(e) = βe.
Proposition A. 1. 7. limz→zmin QE = d(e)g(z), g(zmin) = 0
Proof.








































B Appendix 2: The fossil fuel energy sector satisfies re-
quirements of section 2
Lemma A. 2. 1. dSmin
dz
< 0.















If prices change to z2 > z1 then clearly the firm operating at Smin clearly has the option of keeping
quantities of inputs constant, continuing to produce Emin, and so make strictly positive profits.
Consequently there will be at least one firm with SM < Smin which now finds it profitable to start
producing i.e. with a rise in z there is a new, lower quality firm. Equivalently, dSmin
dz
< 0.




and zmin →∞ as s→ 0.
Proof. zmin is defined by the marginal firm being the only firm i.e. Smin(zmin(s)) = s, so that
no energy industry exists. Aggregate industry inputs and outputs are defined as an integral over
the range [Smin, s]. At z = zmin this interval has zero length and so E(zmin(s), s) = 0 and
QE(zmin(s), s) = 0 are trivially satisfied.
























Lemma 1 shows that dSmin
dz
< 0 in general, and so in particular, dSmin
dz
|z=zmin < 0. Therefore
dzmin(s)
ds
< 0 as req. Taking the limit of the Equation (5) for the marginal firm as s→ 0 (the z to
use for the marginal firm is zmin and the energy output is zero in order to be on the Ṡ = 0 locus
at Sj = s = 0) gives:
α
zmin
= sα ((ρ+ g2s) s)× 1→ 0 as s→ 0⇒ zmin →∞ as s→ 0
i.e. zmin →∞ as s→ 0.



























Assumption A. 2. 1. Let











) = B(i, j)
∀Sj ∈ [Smin(z
∗(si)), si] and ∀si ∈ (0, s] where Ej is given by G(Ej, Sj, z
∗(si)) = 0 and z
∗(si) ≡
equilibrium price ratio given the energy quality parameter si.
This is an uncontroversial regularity assumption. β is the curvature of the energy production
function which is already assumed to be in the interval (0, 1). This assumption just narrows the
interval somewhat, since we can easily show that the denominator is greater than 1:











































































⇒ (ρ+ g2Sj)Sj(1− β)− Ej > 0
































































> 0 by Lemmas 2 & 3




Every element of this sum is rising as z rises. The upper limit of the sum is constant with respect
to z. The lower limit falls with rising z (by Lemma 1). Therefore we clearly have ∂E
∂z
> 0.




























Again, every element of this sum is rising as z rises. The upper limit of the sum is constant




Proposition A. 2. 4. limz→∞E = a(s)z
x, x ≥ 0





















3 and x = 0.





= b(s)zy, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
Proof.






























So b(s) is as above and y = 0 ∈ [0, 1].




E = Es(zmin)× (s− Smin(z))
So g(z) = s − Smin(z) gives the result. Es(zmin) is a strictly positive constant giving the energy
output defined by the zero profit condition for the firm operating at s.




QE = Qs(zmin)× (s− Smin(z))
So g(z) = s− Smin(z) gives the result. Qs(zmin) is a strictly positive constant giving the interme-
diate inputs defined by the zero profit condition for the firm operating at s.
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C Appendix 3: Parameters of simulated economies
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D Appendix 4: SIRS in generalised model
Start with zero profits in the intermediate goods market and substitute:


























































































i.e. if σ <
1
(1− η)(1− γ − µ)
i.e. σ∗ =
1














pK = 0 if
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η − 1
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Abstract
We assess, using a calibrated, 3 country, Melitz trade model, the costs to Catalonia of
independence, against the benefits it would see from not paying the large fiscal transfer
that this relatively wealthy autonomous community pays to the rest of Spain. The model is
calibrated to Catalonia, the rest of Spain, and the rest of the world; and also to Portugal,
Spain and the rest of the world. In so doing, the effective distances between Catalonia & the
rest of Spain, and between Portugal & Spain, are estimated. The intellectual experiment that
is undertaken here is to compare the benefits to Catalonia of not paying the fiscal transfer,
against the costs that arise from its effective distance from the rest of Spain becoming that
of Portugal’s with Spain. We find that the costs outweigh the benefits. We apply this
methodology to other countries in the EU and observe that even those country pairs that are
relatively close in a gravity-style estimation, look to be distant compared to that observed
between sub-national regions. This suggests that the economic benefits, through closer trade
links, of further integration at the EU level are large; and that the costs, given the current




In Catalonian local elections held in November 2012, political parties in favour of independence
from Spain gained most seats. Catalonian independence is therefore a serious possibility in the
short run. Whilst there are many arguments for and against independence that are non-economic
in nature, an economic argument is to the fore in the debate in Catalonia: it is generally accepted
that this relatively wealthy autonomous community, which pays a large fiscal transfer to the rest of
Spain, would be better off on achieving independence as then it would not pay this fiscal transfer.
This paper challenges this assumption by undertaking a quantitative analysis of trade costs of the
breakup of the Spanish union. The results of this analysis are that these costs are possibly larger
than any benefits that Catalonia can expect to realise on independence. At a minimum, in the
debate around the future of Catalonia’s constitutional position, it should not be taken as given
that an economically rational self-interested Catalonian voter would choose independence.
This paper focuses entirely on two aspects of the economic effects of independence or union
for Catalonia: trade costs that come with independence; and fiscal transfer costs that come with
union. It is relatively easy to measure these redistributive fiscal transfer costs, but it is difficult
to measure the advantages of integration. Clearly, there are many other economic issues that we
do not consider here e.g. the costs and failures that may arise from overly distant government
under union (e.g. Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2005)); the costs of “race to the bottom” fiscal
competition (with independence); and other sources of economies and dis-economies of scale. Here
we only consider the application of new trade theory, following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003),
Melitz (2003) and Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2012), to the quantification of the
value of the trade links that come from an integrated economy with a larger market. These trade
benefits can arise for many different underlying reasons, for example: a love of variety means that
the available product range expands with the size of the market and leads to aggregate increasing
returns to scale, as in Krugman (1980); a larger market can lead to better firm selection as
efficient firms expand to serve this larger market, putting upward preassure on wages, and lowering
profitability of low productivity firms who exit, as in Melitz (2003); & traditional Ricardian trade
explanations as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2012)
show that the microfoundations underlying gains from trade, conditional on the value of the
elasticity of trade flows to trade frictions, do not affect the calibrated value of these gains. Therefore
without loss of generality1, we can select a specific model to work with. In this paper we develop
a version of the Melitz (2003) model that is easy to calibrate.
In order to quantify the benefits of union we need a counterfactual scenario that describes
independence. To do this, we suppose that Catalonia will become a country that is as isolated from
1Though to the extent that the selected model determines the value of the elasticity of trade flows to trade
frictions, we do lose generality.
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the rest of Spain, in trade terms, as those other independent countries that the data suggests are
closest to Spain. We call this trade isolation the effective distance. It is difficult to forecast changes
in this distance following national separation: we do not have a theory of its determinants. If we
did have such a theory, we would use it, but in its absence, we construct a plausible counterfactual
scenario. What would happen if the distance between Catalonia and the Rest of Spain came to
be the current distance between Spain and Spain’s closest trading partner: Portugal? It is not
outlandish to think that in the long run Spain’s closest trading partner would be a good model for
the interaction between Catalonia and the rest of Spain.
We do not try to capture transition dynamics because in the short and medium term it is
difficult to guess the degree of interaction, as two forces operate in different directions. The process
of separation may be expected to create tensions which would reduce the interactions between the
former partners. On the other hand, history must have build strong links that may persist for
some time. We do not know how long this transition period will last. Therefore we focus solely on
long run steady state in which Catalonia’s distance with the rest of Spain is the current distance
between Spain and Portugal. The obvious criticism of this approach is that the flow benefits of
not paying the fiscal transfer are realised immediately whereas the costs may not be realised for
several generations. However, it is possible that the short run costs are higher than the long run
costs due to disputes, boycotts and general bad feeling. The long run comparison therefore is akin
to a central estimate of the costs because of the uncertain nature of these two opposing forces.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present empirical evidence that motivates the
exercise: we first describe evidence for the extrordinarily high integration of subnational entities
(regions, countries, states or nations are all loaded terms!) like Catalonia, relative to independent
countries. This evidence motivates our claim that we cannot expect Catalonia to remain as inte-
grated with the Spanish economy post independence, and that increases in trade with the rest of
the world will not fully compensate for this change. To the extent that there are gains from trade,
this reduction in economic integration may be more or less costly. We then describe the evidence
that Portugal is Spain’s closest trading partner and is the most suitable counterfactual comparison
to make to model an independent Catalonia. In section 3 we develop the model, based on Melitz
(2003) and describe the calibration procedure. Section 4 presents the data to which we calibrate.
Section 5 describes our results, and section 6 concludes.
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2 Empirical Evidence
2.1 Catalonia does not look like a country
Looking at Catalonia’s imports and exports naively, it would appear that Catalonia is highly inte-
grated into the global economy with high imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. According
to the Centre Catala de negocis Catalonia is the third largest exporter as a percentage of GDP in
the world.
Figure 2.1: The largest exporters in the world as a percentage of GDP. From http://media.e-
noticies.com/ext/20120706/escri.pdf
However, Catalonia’s trade is very concentrated with the rest of Spain: more than 50% of the
total external trade is with the rest of Spain rather than internationally. The only country that
has a similar trade concentration with a single partner is Canada, because it concentrates its trade
with the USA. The USA is vastly larger than Spain though, and if Catalonia really was an open
economy then it would be expected to do more trade with France than it does with the rest of
Spain since France is larger than the rest of Spain and both are adjacent to Catalonia. In order to
quantify these trade concentration facts, we construct a Herfindahl Index of trade concentration2.
2If there are N countries, with the exports from country i to country j denoted Xij (X
i
i ≡ 0), then the Herfinal









2]. Hi = 1 indicates complete concentration of trade with a single
trading partner. Hi → 0 (equality only possible with infinitely many possible trading partners) indicates complete
diversification of trade across all partners.
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The following figures highlight how anomalous Catalonia’s trade concentration is compared
with independent countries in the European Union. Figure 2.2 shows the Herfindahl index or-
dered from lowest (diverse trade) to highest (concentrated trade). Catalonia’s Herfindahl Index
is approximately double that of the most trade concentrated independent EU member3: it’s an
order of magnitude type comparison. Figure 2.3 show the same data but with countries ordered
by GDP, since we may expect small countries to trade more, and concentrate this trade with their
large neighbours. The negative trend confirms this intuition, and so as a small country we would
expect Catalonia to have a high Herfindahl Index: but not nearly as high as we observe.
Catalonia seems to be anomalous as a country. Proponents of independence point to the
apparent openness of the Catalonian economy as a feature that will support its prosperity as an
independent country. However, the data is suggestive of high Catalonian trade, concentrated with
the rest of Spain, being an artifact of the low effective distance that comes from being part of the
same country. The conclusion of the calibration exercise undertaken in this paper is that Catalonia
concentrates so much its trade with the rest of Spain because its distance with the rest of Spain
it is much lower than the normal distance between independent countries. Catalonia’s status as a
very open economy is entirely a function of this close integration with the rest of Spain and cannot
be expected to survive in the long run after achieving independence.
Figure 2.2: Herfindahl Index of EU27, sorted lowest to highest
2.2 The counterfactual should be Portugal
To undertake a cost benefit analysis of Catalonian independence we need to choose a counterfactual
to represent the long run distance between Catalonia and the rest of Spain under independence.
3Austria, a small country who concentrate their trade with with the EU’s largest economy, Germany.
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Figure 2.3: Herfindahl Index of EU27, plotted against GDP
The most appropriate counterfactual is the closest independent country (in effective trade distance
terms). We do not claim that this represents the distance that Catalonia will achieve with the rest
of Spain on independence, merely that, given the data, it’s the best we can do.
It’s important to stress that we do not choose Portugal because is geographically close to
Spain, but because it trades a lot with Spain. We do not make any claim on why Portugal is so
economically close to Spain. Effective distance may be determined by geography, history, culture,
or simply by chance. We do not probe the reasons for distance or proximity in this paper: we
simply measure distance; although we note that distance appears to be much greater between
independent countries than it does between entities which form part of the same country. Perhaps
this reduced distance arises from the fact that the entities are part of the same political structure4.
Catalans and inhabitants of the rest of Spain share many more things than Portuguese and Spanish:
common regulations; greater interaction (common education, trade-fairs, contacts and networks);
and they share a language. Many of these things are likely to change in with independence over the
medium term. Hence we believe our proposed exercise is a natural way to approach the question
of estimating the magnitude of trade costs that may arise on Catalan independence.
4This proposition is definitely worthy of further research! Many possible mechanism e.g. perhaps government
contracting is important?
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To explore possible counterfactuals we look at Spanish exports to individual countries against
those countries’ GDP. As can be seen on Figure 2.4, Portugal is the most positively anomalous
country i.e. it is the country that trades most with Spain given its size (the vertical distance from
the trend line is akin to the gravity residual in a conventional gravity equation estimation). On
the same chart we also show Catalonia and the rest of Spain: it is even more anomalous.
Figure 2.4: Portugal trades with Spain more than would be expected given just its GDP, based
on a comparison of EU15 countries
Our choice of Portugal as the counterfactual to model Catalonian independence is therefore
justified. Despite Portugal’s apparent strong interactions with Spain (relative to other countries),
its relationship with Spain does not look anything like Catalonia’s does with the rest of Spain.
Table 2.2 compares imports and exports as a percentage of GDP for Portugal & Spain against
Catalonia & the rest of Spain. Xhj denotes exports from h to j, Yh is GDP of h, and in each case
Catalonia or Portugal is j, while Spain or the rest of Spain is h. Therefore the first row in the table
is the bilateral trade as a percentage of the combined GDP of the trading partners. The second
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row is the bilateral trade as a percentage of Portugal and Catalonia’s GDP respectively. The third
row is bilateral trade as a percentage of the Portugal and Catalonia’s trade with the rest of the
world. We see that Catalonia trades much much more with the rest of Spain than Portugal does












In this section we present a version of the standard Hopenhayn-Melitz model of firm heterogeneity
and international trade. We model the world as consisting of three economies h, j and rest of the
world R. These countries use a common currency (i.e. the nominal exchange rate is 1), but the
purchansing power of this common currency can be different in the different countries. In each
economy (h, j and R) there are Dixit-Stiglitz consumers. Thus, the demand for any good i in










where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods
pi is the nominal price of good i
Pj is the price aggregator for country j
qi are the units of good i sold in country j
Yj is the nominal GDP in country j
3.1 Firms
Consider an individual, monopolistically competitive, firm in economy h which takes the demand
for its goods in market j as given. There is a fixed cost for creating a firm, and existing firms
pay a fixed cost per period to operate in a market that is linear in the size of the market. The
operating profit of being active in a country depends positively on that country’s demand, and
depends negatively on the economic distance between the countries of production and sales. A
lower distance has positive effects at the macro level because: it increases the number of firms
serving a market; and it improves the quality of the firms that serve in the country, as the more
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productive firms increase labour demand in order to export. This increases wages, and drives
unproductive firms out of the market.
The life cycle of a firm consists of the following stages:
• A putative firm in h chooses whether to hire c̃ units of labour locally, and incurr the fixed
cost, c̃Wh, to draw some productivity from a known distribution, φ ∼ F (.), which is common
across all economies.
• If it pays that cost, it receives a productivity, φ.
• If this productivity is large enough it goes ahead with production in one or more markets.
Otherwise, it disappears.
• Firms die exogenously with a fixed probability, 1− β, every period.
The only input is labor and production technology is constant returns to scale subject to fixed
costs (to be discussed below). The productivity of a firm from h selling in j is φ/δhj, where φ is
idiosyncratic to the firm and δhj is the distance between markets h and j. δhj is the most important
parameter in the model: the effective trade distance. It reflects how much easier it is to sell into
a domestic market than to sell into a foreign market; and how much more difficult it it is sell to a
country which is further away than to one that is closer. δhj effectively measures the advantages
than a local producer has versus a foreign producer if both have the same intrinsic quality φ. It is
not geographic distance, though geographic distance will have something to do with it, but a much
more general “economic distance”. It will be related to language differences, regulatory differences,
differences in consumer tastes and preferences (as well as, presumably, many other factors). We
do not try to explain where it comes from - we just use a structural model to measure it. This
article is a measurement exercise in the absence of any theory as to the explanatory factors which
determine this distance. If we had a theory of distance, we would use it. Our point is to measure
distance in the context of the model, to undertake thought experiments and make comparisons.
We assume that when selling in to the domestic market, distance equals one, and that this is
the lower bound of distance. We also assume that the distance from h to j equals the distance
from j to h i.e. δhh = δjj = 1 and δhj = δjh ≥ 1. Nominal operating profits for a firm from h


























All production occurs in the firm’s local labour market (h) and so the firm hires local labour at a
nominal wage rate of Wh per unit of effective labour. Profit maximisation yields revenues, labour
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The fixed costs, per unit time, of running a firm in h that sells in market j, is the cost of
hiring a labour force of fixed size to deal with the expenses associated with access to this market.
These expenses depend on both the size of the market that it is going to be served (Yj/Pj) and
the distance of the firm from the market (δhj). The larger the market, the more complex it is to
sell there (and the larger the reward). The more distant the market is, the more complicated it is
to sell there. The number of workers necessary to deal with these access expenses is assumed to
be:
fhj = c× δhj ×
Yj
Pj
(cost parameter, c is equal in all countries)





































Profits and labour demand are increasing in productivity, φ and market size, Yj. A firm from h
will choose to operate in j only if its operating profit from that market exceeeds its fixed cost for
that market. That is, only if its productivity is high enough or the distance low enough:

















Φhj is the threshold of quality of a firm from h to operate in j. In the model we only observe firms
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from h exporting to j if they have an intrinsic productivity larger than Φhj . Φ
h
j will be larger (and
hence we will observe a higher average quality for exporting firms) if: the distance between h and
j is larger, as this increases the complexity of selling into j; labour in h is more expensive, as this
makes production more costly; the real exchange rate Ph/Pj is larger
5, as it is less attractive to sell
to j instead of h (if Pj is low relative to Ph, then the price of your good in country j will necesarily
be low - otherwise you do not sell much in j). Notice that the threshold Φhj is independent of the
size of both markets, in particular it is independent of the size of j. This because of our assumption
that the fixed costs are linear in market size. This assumption simplifies the analysis enormously,
but further, we believe that it is the correct assumption given the purpose of our exercise. The
assumption of fixed costs linear in size ensures that the relative size of two economies is irrelevant if
their δ equals one. If this were not the case then there would be huge implications for the effect of
size upon economic activity. For instance if fixed costs were independent of size (as it is normally
assumed) then larger economies would be much better off - nobody would want to trade with
small economies, and replicating the fact that small economies are typically more open than large
ones would distort the calibrated values of distance. The average distance between h and all of
its trading partners would be inversely related to the size of h, because of the need to compensate
for the independence of the fixed cost and country size. Given the purpose of our exercise, this
seems like the wrong assumption to make: allowing distance to be independent of size seems more
appropriate, and this requires fixed costs be linear in size.







acts as an existence threshold level of productivity6 i.e. those new firms who draw a productivity
φ < Φhh choose not to produce anything. Notice further that those relatively low quality firms that
do choose existence (i.e. φ > Φhh) may still make a realised loss, because their positive profits may
not be sufficient to cover their sunk creation costs. The realised value of creating a firm in country


















Where πhj (φ) is given by equation (1) for φ ≥ Φ
h
j and by zero for φ < Φ
h
j . Notice that, since the
5Ph/Pj is the real exchange rate of the goods sold in j in terms of goods sold in h. Given that the marginal
utility of money in h and j are respectively 1/Ph and 1/Pj , then Ph/Pj is the relative value of money in j with
respect to h.




R} so general existence conditions are complex. We




R and checking that our assumption holds in the resulting
calibration.
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lowest threshold of activity is to operate in the domestic market, all exporters also sell domestically,
but not vice versa.
3.2 The average firm.
We assume that the firm quality distribution function is a Pareto distribution with exponent k




We can therefore evaluate the distribution function for productivity and hence the probability of
a firm, having received its productivity draw, choosing to produce:




















We assume k > θ − 1 so that average profits, revenues and labour demand are defined7.

















































































The average labour demand8 is the sum of the labor demand used for selling into each of the three
markets, and average revenues are the sum of the revenues from selling into each of the three
7Profits, revenues and labour demand also have a Pareto distribution, but with exponent k + 2− θ. The means
of these Pareto distributions are only defined if k + 2− θ > 1 i.e. k > θ − 1.
8Notice that labour demand from the average firm does not depend on the wage. The total labour demand it is






























The world economy in this model will be in steady state general equilibrium if we have steady
state equilibrium in three markets:
1. Financial Markets:
Within each country there are perfect financial markets which allow prospective firms to
borrow to finance firm creation via contingent contracts which, in equilibrium, will be repaid
using any realised profits. Free entry for entrepreneurs to create firms therefore means that
the expected value of firm creation will be driven to zero:































Let the number of firms producing in economy h be Mh, then we know that in each period
(1 − β)Mh firms die. In steady state, Mh is constant and so the number of entrepreneurs
who hire labour in an attempt to create a firm must be such that the resulting number of
firms that choose to operate (i.e. who have φ > Φhh) is equal to (1 − β)Mh i.e. the labour


















Total demand for effective labour is the sum of Lcreation and the labour employed by the
firms that have decided to go ahead (MhL̄
h). Effective labour supply, Sh is an exogenous
parameter, different in different economies, that we will calibrate to. This parameter can
be interpreted as the population in a country (Nh from data) multiplied by an intrinsic,
unobserved, productivity (Ah) which can be calculated given our calibrated value of Sh.
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In this exercise, we allow for a fiscal transfer from j to h (remember the existence of a
fiscal transfer from Catalonia to the rest of Spain provides some of the momentum towards
independence) of FSjWj. F is the percentage of GDP transferred from j to h (which in
principle could be negative). There is no fiscal transfer to or from R.
Yj = (1− F )SjWj (5)
Yh = ShWh + FSjWj (6)
YR = SRWR (7)
To close the model we equalise income and aggregate demand by imposing a balance of pay-
ments for each economy. Payments are balanced, albeit not necessarily bilaterally balanced.
Thus, in each country total export earnings plus any net fiscal transfers received are equal
to total import expenditures. There can be bilateral surpluses or deficits, but overall there









h i.e. BoP in h
Xjh +X
j




j i.e. BoP in j







j i.e. BoP in R
Exports from h to j are:
Xhj = Mh


























































































































Equations (2), (3) & (4) (all ×3 for h, j & R), plus equations (5), (6), (7), (8), & (9) constitute
14 equations in 15 unknowns ({Dh, Dj, DR, Ph, Pj, PR, Yh, Yj, YR, Wh,Wj,WR,Mh,Mj,MR}) which
can be solved by assuming that one of the price indices is normalised to 1. The system has 12
parameters ({θ, µ, δhj, δhR, δjR, c, c̃, b, β, Sh, Sj, SR}). We can simplify the system greatly by making
the transformations detailed in Appendix 1. This produces a system of 10 equations (see below) in
10 endogenous variables ({d̃h, d̃j, Qhj, Q̃hR, ỹh, ỹj, w̃h, w̃j, M̃h, M̃j}) with 6 parameters ({θ, µ, δ,∆h,
∆j, sj}). sj is the relative effective size of j with respect to h. This is equal to (NjAj)/(NhAh).
Given that we take Nj and Nh directly from the data, sj gives us the implied ratio of worker’s
productivity. Notice however that this does not map directly into observed productivity because
it is filtered by the distribution of firm’s qualities. ∆h and ∆j are measures of effective size of the
rest of the world from the viewpoint of h and j respectively. This is the effective size filtered by
the economic distance between the rest of the world and h & j respectively. The larger it is, the
more economic interaction there is with R. The ratio of ∆h to ∆j is a measure of the relative
distance to the rest of the world of h with respect to j.
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∆j − F d̃j
)
For a given set of parameters, we determine equilibrium by applying the Newton-Raphson
method to find the roots of the above system of equations. We apply the Simulated Method of
Moments (see Appendix 1) until we equate a vector of data targets with their modelled equivalents.
4 Data
All data is for the year 2005.
4.1 Aggregate Data
The aggregate data is data on GDP and on trade flows (both goods and services) at the national
level and at the level of Spain’s autonomous communities. Appendix 2 details exactly what the
data is and where it comes from.
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4.2 Micro Data
The microdata, Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESSE), is data on the distribution of
Spanish firms. Appendix 2 details what the data is and where it comes from. From this data, we
identify firms as Catalan or as coming from the rest of Spain. We observe their total sales and in
which region (local, national or international) these sales were made.
4.3 Selection of k and θ
The other data that we use is the economic literature. We take the elasticity of substitution, θ,
from the literature and follow the procedure that others have followed in determining the pareto
distribution parameter, k. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) (BEJK) select a θ of 3.79
to match the size and productivity advantage of US firms that export9. Many papers use θ = 3.8
following BEJK, see e.g. Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Davis and Harrigan (2011), and Bernard,
Redding, and Schott (2007).
Some papers calibrate k to match the standard deviation of log domestic sales in the US (as
found by BEJK). See e.g. Davis and Harrigan (2011) (k = 3.4), Ghironi and Melitz (2005) (k = 3.4)
, Demidova (2008) (k = 3.3), Felbermayr and Jung (2012) (k = 3.3). The Standard deviation of
log firm sales in the model of Section 3 is given by (θ− 1)/k. Therefore, using the microdata, and
conditional on θ = 3.8:
Stdev log sales Implied k
Observed US data (BEJK 2003) 1.67 1.7
Simulated US data (BEJK 2003) 0.84 3.3
Spain data (ESSE survey) 1.90 1.5
For the mean firm profits, revenue and labour demand to be defined, a parameter restriction of
θ − 1 < k is imposed i.e. the value of k must be greater than kmin = 2.8. It is impossible to
simultaneously match a standard deviation of log sales, which in our model is given by (θ − 1)/k,
with a value greater than 1 as well as impossing the θ − 1 < k restriction from the model.
5 Results
To generate our results we calibrate the model in two configurations in which the parameters not
calibrated are:
9Though in BEJK markups (and not productivity) are drawn from a pareto distribution, so the shape parameter
used in their paper is not applicable.
93




Configuration 1 uses the parameters of BEJK 2003 for a simulated distribution of firms in the US,
while Configuration 2 is an attempt to use the Spanish firm data. The standard deviation of firm
size in Spain appears to be substantially larger than in the US and in order to match this moment
we would need to have a vey low value of k, which would be incompatible with our model given
the established value of θ. Because of this we choose the minimum value for k compatible with
our restrictions, 2.8. The effect of using a larger k than suggested by the data is to underestimate
the cost of larger distance (with respect to this choice of k)
We take the transfer of Catalonia to rest of Spain to be 6.5% of the GDP of Catalonia. This is
the official number for the transfer with the methodology of ”flujo beneficio” for the year 2005. In
2009 this number would be 5.8% of the GDP of Catalonia. We do not allow for an international
transfer (e.g. EU structural funds) in the Portugal - Spain calibration.
The parameters that we calibrate using SMM are therefore {sj, δ,∆h,∆j} (where h labels
Spain or the rest of Spain, and j labels Portugal or Catalonia respectively in each calibration). To
calibrate these parameters we target:
• The interaction between h and j: (Xhj +Xjh)/(Yh + Yj)
• Total trade in h: (Xhj +Xjh +XhR +XRh)/Yh
• Total trade in j : (Xhj +Xjh +XjR +XRj)/Yj
• Relative GDP: Yh/Yj
To validate the model results we use the average sales of Catalan Firms in the rest of Spain,
divided by the average international sales of Catalan firms. It is not clear whether this ratio will
be less than or greater than 1: the numerator includes firms with lower productivity and is the
average of sales into a smaller market, however the denominator is the average of sales into a more
distant market. Cat firm size ratio is defined as:

























5.1 Catalonia’s distance with Rest of Spain
Catalonia/RoSpain Calibrated Parameters



















Per-capita incomes are matched to the data, and we derive a ratio of efficiency labour per capita




θ = 3.8, k = 3.3 1.47
θ = 3.8, k = 2.8 1.50
For model validation we look at how the distribution of firm sizes implied by the model matches
the distribution in the data. It does so remarkably well:
Model Validation MODEL DATA
Cat firm size ratio 0.92482 0.88
5.2 Portugal’s distance with Spain
Portugal/Spain Calibrated Parameters





Per-capita incomes are matched to the data, and we derive a ratio of efficiency labour per capita





θ = 3.8, k = 3.3 0.91
θ = 3.8, k = 2.8 0.93
Notice that the distance implied between Portugal and Spain is substantially larger than the
distance implied between Catalonia and the Rest of Spain.
Portugal/Spain MODEL DATA













5.3 Experiment 1: Changing Distance.
θ = 3.8, k = 3.3 δ = 1.4336 δ = 2.3481 % change
Yj B$211.5 B$191.7 −9.4%







Φjj n/a n/a −12.5%
Φjh n/a n/a +79.7%
ΦjR n/a n/a −6.4%
θ = 3.8, k = 2.8 δ = 1.5643 δ = 2.8876 % change
Yj B$211.5 B$187.4 −11.4%







Φjj n/a n/a −15.2%
Φjh n/a n/a +107.7%
ΦjR n/a n/a −7.6%
We equate nominal GDP to its value in the data, which implies a value for the parameters that
were eliminated with the variable substitutions. This is irrelevant, as we only make comparisons
on changes or ratios of GDP from where these parameters disappear. The increase in distance with
the largest trading partner of Catalonia has dramatic effects on trade and GDP. The deadweight
loss (the percentage change in Yh+Yj) is 3.3% of GDP in configuration 1, and 4.1% in configuration
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2. In any case a large GDP fall. The degree of interaction with the rest of Spain becomes similar
to the Portuguese one. It is actually somewhat lower due to the fact that Catalonia is closer to the
rest of the World than Portugal is. The degree of interaction with the rest of the world increases,
as Catalan firms find harder to sell in the rest of Spain, and thus reallocate towards the rest of the
world. Notice that this increase is not of the same magnitude than the decrease in trade with the
rest of Spain due to the fact that there is no decrease in the intrinsic distance with the rest of the
world. Likewise Catalan consumers become less prone to consume Spanish products.
The most remarkable result reported in this table is the implications that changing the distance
has on firm composition, and via this mechanism, on TFP. Wages in Catalonia fall, and this makes
less productive firms viable. Notice the fall in the threshold of quality of domestic firms. Morover,
the threshold of quality for exporting to the rest of Spain rises dramatically, as it is much harder
to overcome the larger distance, while the threshold to export to the rest of the world actually
falls due to lower wages. There is an aditional composition effect, as wages fall, less productive
firms account for a larger share of employment, pushing TFP down.
5.4 Experiment 2: Changing Transfers.
θ = 3.8, k = 3.3 δ = 1.4336, F = 0.065 δ = 2.3481, F = 0 % change
Yj B$211.5 B$206.2 −2.5%







Φjj n/a n/a −11.8%
Φjh n/a n/a +83.2%
ΦjR n/a n/a −4.9%
θ = 3.8, k = 2.8 δ = 1.5643, F = 0.065 δ = 2.8876, F = 0 % change
Yj B$211.5 B$201.7 −4.6%







Φjj n/a n/a −14.4%
Φjh n/a n/a +112.6%
ΦjR n/a n/a −5.8%
Obviously money that is not transfered to the rest of Spain increases Catalan GDP. This increase
is more that 6.5% of GDP (it’s around 7.6%) due to multiplier effects from the IRS implied in
the Dixit-Stiglitz framework. Notice though that the deadweight losses are very similar to before
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(3.4% and 4.2% in each configuration). What changes here is the distribution of the losses, which
now fall more heavily on the rest of Spain. This distribution of losses does not greatly affect the
impacts on the firm quality distribution. The loss in Catalonia is mitigated by not paying the fiscal
transfer, but these losses are still substantial, whilst the loss in the rest of Spain is now larger.
5.5 Border Effects Within The EU
We see that Catalonia is much closer to the rest of Spain than Portugal is to Spain. Can we
interpret this as an effect of belonging to a single country? Are sub national borders ”thinner”
than the ”thick” borders between nations? The single market in the EU is an attempt to create
the trade benefits of a single country across Europe. Are national borders within the EU ”thinner”
than borders across the EU/non-EU divide? The following table shows the distances between the
(rest of the) EU and Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, calibrated from 3 country models
also featuring the rest of the world:
θ = 3.8, k = 3.3 δ
Norway vs the EU 2.5700
Sweden vs rest of the EU 2.4220
Switzerland vs the EU 2.2991
Austria vs the rest of the EU 2.2166
Portugal vs Spain (for Comparison) 2.3481
The borders between these countries and the (rest of the) EU look similar to each other and similar
to the border between Portugal and Spain10. Obviously there are many potential endogeneity issues
here e.g. perhaps Switzerland did not join the EU since there were some costs, and it already had
all the distance and trade benefits that it could get from the EU countries, whilst countries that
could gain trade benefits on joining did so and have now reduced their distance to something akin
to Switzerland’s. However, these results suggest that we may be able to draw the conclusion that
the EU/non EU border looks like any other country border, i.e. it is much ”thicker” than the
”thin”, within country borders, such as that between Catalonia and the rest of Spain.
5.6 Comparing the results with the Literature
Our estimated impact on Catalonian trade is perfectly consistent with the literature on border
effects taking into account endogeneity and trade with the rest of the world. In particular our
results are in line with Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) (AvW) [quoting from section V]:
10The results are suggestive of a small border effect from the EU though.
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“Based on the estimated multi-country model, international trade among ROW countries [i.e.,
not US and Canada] drops to a fraction 0.71 of that under free trade, while intranational trade
rises on average by a factor 3.8. This implies a factor 5.4 (3.8/.71) increase in intranational trade
relative to international trade.”
Catalan trade with the rest of Spain in Experiment 1 (we label this results Virtual Catalonia 1,
and choose Experiment 1 rather than Experiment 2 so as not to contaminate the effect of simply
changing distance with the additional effect from the fiscal transfer11) is about 80% lower than
in the data12. This is the same order as AvW measured for the average border effect. If we call
X(0) Catalonian imports and exports to the rest of Spain under free trade (in AvW parlance this
is trade when there are no frictions at all between any country in the world), X(1) imports and
exports under a political union (i.e. within national borders, in our case, the trade that exists
between Catalonia and the rest of Spain in the data), and X(2) the imports and exports to the
rest of Spain from Virtual Catalonia 1 (i.e. the trade between two countries with normal borders










Thus, the AvW analysis suggests that we should expect to see a trade fall of around 80% when
comparing trade across a border to trade without the border (but with the rest of the world
having such a border). Our result is consistent with AvW, and so it appears that Catalonia is not
exceptional when viewed under the light of the border effect. The reason why it trades “so much”
and why it concentrates trade in Spain is just the “thick” border with the rest of the world and
the “thin” border (small distance) with the rest of Spain.
5.7 The Gains from Trade
The gains from trade in the literature are usually expressed as a welfare cost on moving to an
autarkic state. Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2012) (ACRC) develop a standard
formula for the gains from trade, based only upon the share, λ, of expenditure on domestic goods
(observable from data), and the elasticity, ǫ, of trade flows with respect to variable trade costs
(from gravity equation estimation), for a whole class of models i.e. essentially all models that have
a gravity equation representation have the same maping from trade flows to welfare gains/losses.
11i.e. Virtual Catalonia 1 is Catalonia as distant from the rest of Spain as Portugal is from Spain, but still paying
the fiscal transfer.
12(13.7%× $191.7)/(60.7%× $211.5) = 20% under Configuration 1.
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From ACRC, the gravity equation needed to estimate ǫ is:
lnXhj = Ah +Bj + ǫ ln δhj + ν
h
j
where Ah & Bj are a sum of regressors multiplied by their coefficients
δhj can be identified with the trade distance we discuss
and ν is the residual, zero for a theoretical model as opposed to an
empirical exercise.
The model of this paper is within the class of models described by ACRC. The gravity equation
implied our model is:
logXhj = log Yh − logDh + log Yj + (1− µ) logQhj + (1− µ) log δhj + 0
Clearly the model presented in this paper has ǫ ≡ 1−µ. We can therefore calculate the gains from
trade both using ACRC formula and by setting distances to infinity and running the model. They
agree as required. The ACRC formula is: Cost of autarky = λ1/ǫ− 1, and the calculated costs are:
k = 3.3; θ = 3.8 λ ACRC Formula Result Modelled Result
Spain 71.5% 10.1% 10.1%
Portugal 67.5% 12.0% 12.0%
Catalonia (data) 39.9% N/A N/A
Catalonia (no transfer) 39.4% 30.7% 30.7%
Virtual Catalonia 2 55.1% 18.7% 18.7%
Note that the model is not capable of running with a fiscal transfer from Catalonia to the rest
of Spain under autarky (and the ACRC formula is not valid in the presence of such a transfer). It
is impossible to achieve a balance of payments if there is a fiscal transfer in one direction that is not
offset by trade in the other direction. It is for this reason that the table shows Virtual Catalonia 2 :
Catalonia as distant from the rest of Spain as Portugal is from Spain, and with no fiscal transfer13.
The trade literature estimates very low gains from trade (see Table IX of Eaton and Kortum
(2002) for a set of much lower estimates of the costs of autarky than those above) and the re-
sults presented here are somewhat anomalous. The discrepancy arises from the estimation of the
elasticity, ǫ, of imports with respect to variable trade costs. Most of the theoretical trade litera-
ture finds data on the variable trade costs and run regressions to determine this elasticity. This
leaves the possibility that these trade costs are underestimated and so the regression coefficient is
13If GDP Catalonia = 100%, then GDP Virtual Catalonia 1 = 90.6%, GDP Catalonia (No Transfer) = 107.4%,
GDP Virtual Catalonia 2 = 97.5%, and GDP Catalonia Autarky = 82.1%. The ACRC Cost of Autarky calculation
is then of the form: 107.4%/82.1% = 130.7% & 97.5%/82.1% = 118.7%.
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overestimated. Indeed the Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) survey finds gravity equation based
estimates for this trade elasticity in the range (−10,−5) as compared with the values of −3.5 and
−2.8 that are used here (in Configuration 1 and 2 respectively). The alternative methodology used
in this paper (whereby we use: accepted primitive parameters for elasticity of substitution between
goods; then try to match moments of the firm distribution; and then use a structural model to cal-
culate the elasticity of trade flows with respect to variable trade costs) perhaps provides a clue to a
puzzle in the trade literature. ACRC note in their concluding remarks that [quoting from section 6]:
“If many of our theoretical models predict the same gains from trade, how can these gains be so
much smaller than the reduced-form estimates uncovered by empirical researchers? For instance,
Feyrer (2009) concludes that an increase in trade volumes of 10% implies an increase in real in-
come of 5%. While this elasticity lies below the previous estimates of Frankel and Romer (1999),
it is an order of magnitude larger than the elasticity implied by gravity models. How does one
reconcile theory and empirics?”
The methodology used in this exercise suggests that part of the discrepancy between theory
and empirics may be due to the fact that existing theoretical trade literature takes the measure
of distance from data, and with it they estimate the elasticity of trade to distance. But this data
on distance and frictions is a composite of tariff and fiscal distance which may omit important
frictions. We calibrate frictions - we do not get them from data. Our frictions are larger than the
frictions typically used, and thus, our gains from trade are larger too.
There is one important feature to note about the gains from trade: economically integrated
regions within a country have almost as much to lose from losing this close integration and becoming
a normal independent country, as normal independent countries have from becoming autarkic. This
is consistent with the large positive welfare effects of moving to a zero gravity world in Eaton and
Kortum (2002) (see Table X). We can show this graphically by generating a series of welfare results
for Catalonia, changing only distance with the rest of Spain between each result and graphing on
a single plot, see Figure 5.1. Independent countries exist along the ‘flat part’ of the ‘distance vs
GDP’ curve, whereas sub-national regions exist in the steeper region where gains from trade are
larger. This suggests that there may exist large economic benefits, through closer trade links, of
further integration at the EU level (since we observe that the borders between EU member states
are of the “thick”, independent country type).
Catalonia’s cost of autarky figure is very high, but this is because it is the composition of two
losses. The first loss is the increase in frictions with the rest of Spain, that were very low (much
lower than the normal between countries), and are then those of a normal country. The second
loss is the increase in frictions from having normal borders with the rest of Spain and with the
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Figure 5.1: Catalan GDP as a function of effective distance with the rest of Spain. Note that
the limit of infiite distance on this plot does not correspond to the autarkic Catalonia - the only
distance that is being changed in this plot is the distance with the rest of Spain, the distance with
the rest of the world is unaltered.
rest of the world, to having infinite frictions. This composite effect means that we would expect
the cost of autarky for sub-national regions to be much higher than is estimated for independent
countries of equivalent size. Therefore the costs, given the current institutional framework, of the
break-up of EU member states into smaller states within the EU, may be relatively high.
6 Conclusions
In this article, we have shown evidence that Catalonia seems to have an exceptionally high level
of economic integration with the rest of Spain. The level of this integration is such that Catalonia
does not look like other independent countries, and we suggest that it is unreasonable to believe
that this level of economic integration will persist in the event of independence. A more reasonable
assumption is that Catalonia will become a country which is relatively close to the rest of Spain, but
not exceptionally close compared with other independent countries. The natural counterfactual to
use to model an independent Catalonia is Portugal, which is economically close to Spain, but not
exceptionally close like Catalonia currently is.
The exercise that we undertake is then to calibrate our structural model, based on Melitz (2003),
to Catalonia, the rest of Spain, and the rest of the world; and to Portugal, Spain, and the rest of
the world. These calibrations produce a set of parameters which, when plugged into the model,
reproduce the incomes and trade flows seen in the data. In the calibrations, Portugal is much
further from Spain than Catalonia is from the rest of Spain. The policy experiment undertaken is
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simply to replace Catalonia’s distance with the rest of Spain with Portugal’s distance from Spain,
and to observe the impacts upon incomes and trade flows. We show that the losses associated with
this increase in distance from the rest of Spain are large. The combined GDP loss of increasing
the distance is of between 3.3 and 4.2 percent. From the point of view of Catalonia, the loss if
unaccompanied by a fiscal gain is huge: of the between 9.4 and 11.4 percent. If Catalonia gains
from not paying a fiscal transfer to the rest of Spain then the loss for Catalonia is between 2.5 and
4.6 percent: smaller, but still substantial. Clearly in this case the loss for the rest of Spain would
be much larger.
Given the form of the structural model used to model this, a large share of the GDP loss
on independence is a consequence of a worsening in the distribution of firm quality in Catalonia:
mediocre firms that would find it impossible to survive when facing direct competition from the
rest of Spain, would find it profitable to survive in the independence scenario. This is because
they are sheltered from more intense competition by the larger distance. In the Melitz model,
there are two dimensions that characterise a firm: its quality and its location. When distance
increases location becomes more salient. Unproductive but local firms find themselves in a better
competitive position, and they access more of what is now a captive market. This reallocation
towards inefficiency is a plausible mechanism for generating costs of independence: the rise of
mediocricity.
This paper makes a methodological contribution in calibrating economic distances given ob-
served trade flows within a structural model that has been calibrated to accepted primitive pa-
rameters and to firm distribution statistics. The resulting costs of autarky are very large relative
to the economic literature, a discrepancy which arises from two sources. The headline reason for
this discrepancy is that in the case of sub-national entities, the cost of autarky is magnified due
to the exceptionally high degree of integration that exists within countries. There is a genuinely
higher cost of autarky due to this effect. There is an additional component which arises from the
methodology: primitive parameters and firm distribution statistics suggest a much higher elas-
ticity of trade flows to trade frictions than is estimated when trade flows are regressed on some
series that is deemed to represent trade frictions. Further research is required on resolving this
discrepancy, and this research is underway.
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A Appendix 1: Model Solution
Transformations
• We assume that the rest of the world is exogenous with respect to h and j. Therefore the
equations which relate the variables in the rest of the world to themselves can be eliminated
and replaced with the exogenous parameters YR,MR,WR which appear in the other the equa-
tions for h and j. The parameter SR and the variable DR drop out completely. We therefore
have reduced the system to 10 equations in 10 endogenous variables with 14 parameters.
• We write the system in real terms, so that xi = Xi/Pi, for all variables and parameters,
X ∈ {Y,W,D} & i ∈ {h, j, R}. The price indices are replaced with the relative price indices,
Qhj = Ph/Pj and QhR = Ph/PR
• It is found that we can redefine the endogenous variables by mutiplying through by a com-
bination of parameters of the model without changing any of the interesting ratios given by
the model. Many of the parameters can then be cancelled. This vastly reduces the dimen-





















































δ = δhj = δjh
Notice that we do not transform Qhj. The variables that will be used in the model solution
are the tilde versions, which are implicitly defined above. This means that absolute values
for the model’s endogenous variables cannot be seen from our calibration. What we can see
are changes between two calibrations. Moreover all our targets are relative variables and so
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we are not losing any information by making these change of variables.
Simulated Method of Moments
Given a vector of data targets, TD, and their modelled equivalents, TM . We adjust the parameters
of the model until TM = TD, using a version of the Simulated Method of Moments:
• Choose the same number of data targets as unknown parameters, and observe TD.
• Guess some initial parameters and solve for the model equilibrium, and so determine TM .
• Let Y ≡ TD − TM .
• Perturb each of the unknown parameters around their current values and record the effect
these perturbation have on the TM vector in the square matrix, X (each column records
TM(new)− TM(old)).
• The vector, N , of the number of times these parameter perturbations have to be applied in
order to move the modelled targets to the data, satisfies Y −XN = 0 i.e. N = X−1Y
• N implies some new parameter set which, if the equilibria are linear in parameter space, will
give us TM = TD.
• Given non-linearity, changing the parameters by the amount implied by the calculated value
of N will not actually take us to the point where TM = TD. However, this process is applied
repeatedly until we converge upon the solution.
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B Appendix 2: Details of the data
Aggregate Data
All data is for the year 2005
• Bilateral trade between Spain and Portugal in goods is acquired from the OECD ”STAN
Bilateral Trade Database”.
• Bilateral trade between Spain and Portugal in services is aquired from OECD ”Trade in
Services by Partner Country”. Spain does not report exports in services to Portugal in 2005.
Exports from Spain to Portugal in services are aquired from Portugal’s reported imports
from Spain.
• Data for trade in goods and services is the sum of these two values. Everything is reported
in dollars.
• Bilataral trade flows in goods and services between Catalonia and the rest of Spain/rest of
world is aquired from the Statistical Institute of Catalonia (IDESCAT) 2005 input-output
table.
– Value of Catalan exports to rest of Spain is 35.52% of Catalan GDP
– Value of Catalan exports to rest of the world is 30.4% of Catalan GDP
– Value of Catalan imports from rest of Spain is 25.16% of Catalan GDP
– Value of Catalan imports from rest of world is 36.06% of Catalan GDP
• GDP of Spain and Portugal is from the world bank (world development indicators).
• Eurostat reports that Catalonia’s GDP is 18.7% of Spain’s GDP
Data Summary ($)
RoSpain (h) & Catalonia (j) Spain(h) & Portugal (j)
Yh 919, 275, 613, 609 1, 130, 798, 885, 738
Yj 211, 523, 272, 129 191, 847, 858, 529
Xhj 53, 223, 709, 552 20, 973, 098, 000
Xjh 75, 144, 306, 877 12, 245, 288, 721
XhR 223, 308, 603, 857 266, 645, 329, 000
XjR 64, 309, 823, 143 41, 046, 170, 331
XRh 280, 503, 308, 146 344, 529, 506, 279
XRj 76, 271, 486, 854 50, 534, 969, 000
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Micro Data
• We use 2005 data from the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESSE) which surveys
a representative sample of manufacturing firms in Spain with more than 10 employees. 1911
firms provide information about their sales.
• We define a firm to be Catalan if more than 50% of a firm’s employment is based in Catalan
plants. A firm is Rest of Spain if less than 50% of its employment is based in Catalonia
plants. According to this criterion, 414 firms in our sample are Catalan and 1497 are Rest
of Spain.
• The key statistics we are interested in are the percentage of Catalan and Rest of Spain firms
who sell in the Rest of Spain and Catalonia respectively and the percentage of Catalan and
Rest of Spain firms who export to the rest of the world.
• To find this, we use the variable ”geographic range of the market.” This variable tells us the
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th most important markets to the responding firm.
• The six potential responses are 1. Local, 2. Provincial, 3. Regional, 4. National, 5. Abroad,
6. Domestic and Abroad.
• We assume that a Catalan firm only sells in Catalonia (Φjj < φ < Φ
j
h) if the firm does not list
”National,” ”Domestic and Abroad” and ”Abroad” as one of the most important markets
and if they say they do not export. We assume a Rest of Spain firm does not sell in Catalonia
if the same conditions are met.
• A firm sells in the ROW if it responds yes to the question of whether or not they export.
• For verification of the calibration, we look at the ratio of sales of firms who at least sell in
the rest of Spain φ > Φjh to sales of firms who export φ > Φ
j
R
Average Sales of Firms
Sales Revenue (e) n
Firms with φ > Φjh 95, 404, 810 355
Firms with φ > ΦjR 108, 394, 800 307
Ratio = 0.88
• Domestic sales = total sales - export revenue. The standard deviation of log domestic sales
is 1.9
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